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Preface 
This research report is based on the results of the research project “Organised crime in the field 
of residential burglary”. This study was financed with resources of the European Union's Inter-
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would like to express our sincere thanks to Prof. Dr Dirk Baier, who was substantially involved 
in the development and elaboration of the project idea. 
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Louisa Johanningmeier, who supported us throughout the various stages of the project in sur-
veying, evaluating and preparing the research report. 
We would particularly like to thank the 71 police officers and public prosecutors who agreed 
to participate in expert interviews as part of the investigation. We are especially grateful for the 
time our interview partners have taken and their willingness to get involved in discussions and 
share their experiences and reflections on the topic with us. 
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1 Introduction 
The crime of residential burglary has attracted increased attention in Germany for several years, 
both on the part of police and judicial prosecution as well as policymakers and in media reports. 
In addition to the scientific findings on the psychological situation of the victims (Schubert 
Lustig, 2011; Wollinger, Dreißigacker, Blauert, Bartsch & Baier, 2014; Wollinger, 2016), this 
topic is also relevant based on the development of case numbers. According to police crime 
statistics, the total number of residential burglaries increased over a period of nearly ten years 
starting in 2006 by a total of 57.62%.1 A downward trend has only been evident since 2016.2  
Making statements about the perpetrators is complicated by the fact that few crimes are ulti-
mately solved by the police. Studies show that only about 2.0 to 2.6% of cases end with at least 
one convicted perpetrator (Kawelovski, 2012; Dreißigacker, Wollinger, Blauert, Schmitt, 
Bartsch & Baier, 2016). Previous investigations of these convicted burglars have revealed a 
wide range of characteristics and motives among the perpetrators, ranging from relationship-
related crimes, drug-related crimes, opportunistic perpetrators and groups of people operating 
across regions all the way to organised crime structures (e.g. Dreißigacker, Baier, Wollinger & 
Bartsch, 2015). Debates regarding successful investigative practices and the necessary political 
measures focus on the spectrum of well-organised perpetrators. In contrast to spontaneous oc-
casional acts, which typically occur in the area of drug-related crime, we focus here on the 
phenomenon of “organised residential burglary”. This refers to acts of burglary with a certain 
degree of planning and preparation or follow-up and are committed by perpetrators who do so 
repeatedly over a relatively long period of time.  
While a great deal of research has  been conducted in Germany on the phenomenon of residen-
tial burglary dealing with questions such as the situation of the victims, the process of investi-
gation, the characteristics of the acts and initial findings on (convicted) perpetrators and sus-
pects, so far there has been no comprehensive investigation into the area of organised residential 
burglary. Findings highlighting organised crime in connection with residential burglary are pro-
vided on the one hand by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and on the other hand by 
Europol's so-called "SOCTA" report (Serious and organised crime threat assessment).  
During the reporting period of 2016, a total of 563 organised crime proceedings were conducted 
nationwide (Bundeskriminalamt [BKA], 2016, p. 4). Of these, 98 proceedings fell into the area 
of property crime, although it is not possible to differentiate further how many proceedings 
concerned residential burglary (Bundeskriminalamt [BKA], 2016, p. 5). 
A Europe-wide study on serious and organised crime is available in Europol's SOCTA report 
(Europol, 2017a). In preparing this report, Europol uses data that it receives in the course of its 
activities from Member States and third countries on the one hand, and freely accessible data, 
for example from NGOs and scientific studies, on the other. In addition, the data are compared 
with those of other EU institutions such as Eurojust and FRONTEX (Council of the European 
Union, 2012, p. 17 et seq.). According to Europol's analysis, there are over 5,000 organised 
crime groups (OCGs) throughout Europe that operate internationally and are characterised by 
                                                 
1 According to police crime statistics for 2006-2016, published by the Federal Criminal Police Office, Wiesbaden. 
2 According to police crime statistics 2017, published by the Federal Criminal Police Office, Wiesbaden. 
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a high degree of flexibility and adaptability (Europol, 2017a, p. 10). There has also been an 
increase in the number of burglaries (Europol, 2010, p. 10 et seq.). Here you will find both 
highly specialised groups and OCGs working in various fields. The dominant groups are hier-
archically structured OCGs with primarily six or more members in a group, which tend not to 
specialise in a single crime (Europol, 2017a, p. 14). 
In addition to the above-mentioned data sources on organised crime, there are isolated descrip-
tions of investigative proceedings in the area of gang residential burglary, such as that of Nath 
(2013), which uses a series of proceedings to show the course of investigations until the con-
clusion of criminal proceedings based on investigative methods and findings on perpetrator 
patterns. As a result, Nath notes that investigators often fail to determine the extent to which 
perpetrators act in criminal networks. In addition, perpetrators are becoming more and more 
professional, giving them a large lead over the investigating authorities (Nath, 2013, p. 583). A 
similar study is available in Winter (2015), which analyses investigative experiences in Baden-
Württemberg. This study shows that Georgian suspects in particular are internationally net-
worked and can be attributed to organised crime (Winter, 2015, p. 574). A previous survey of 
travelling and immigrant perpetrators conducted by the Criminological Research Institute of 
Lower Saxony e.V. (KFN; Wollinger & Jukschat, 2017) provided insight into the background, 
procedures and self-perception of burglars entering Germany from abroad and committing bur-
glaries. However, since this study was based on the voluntary participation of the perpetrators, 
it can be assumed that strongly organised, mafia-like structures were not addressed. Further-
more, this investigation focused on the perspective of the perpetrators. This did not provide any 
insights into police investigation practice. However, it is important to gain knowledge about 
how the police and the judicial system are currently investigating in the context of organised 
residential burglary and the hurdles involved, especially regarding the hypothesis that offenders 
acting in multiple regions, who often also have links to other countries, pose numerous chal-
lenges for criminal investigation authorities. 
Given these considerations, the research project "Organised crime in the area of residential bur-
glary" was conceived. This research report presents the results of an extensive survey of police 
officers and public prosecutors, which constitutes the first part of the research project.3 So-
called guideline-supported structered expert interviews were conducted with police officers and 
public prosecutors who are involved in the investigation of organised residential burglaries. 
One strength of the investigation lies in the scope of the expert interviews. A total of 25 inter-
views were conducted in all German states except Hesse. Ten interviews were conducted in 
focus groups.  In these focus groups, police officers and representatives of the public prosecu-
tor's office were interviewed together. In total, 36 police officers and 18 public prosecutors were 
questioned. The police officers were members of the State Criminal Police Offices or the local 
police stations. They worked as investigators, held management positions in departments or 
positions of public relations, were responsible for analysis or belonged to the department for 
property crime, organised crime and gang crime or were members of an investigation team. The 
                                                 
3 The second part of the research project relates to a criminal record analysis of procedures reported to the BKA 
as organised crime for the years 2014 to 2016. The first results will be available at the beginning of 2019. 
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prosecutors were department heads or heads of organised crime departments or the General 
Department for Adult Criminal Cases. 
A special feature of the study is that the aspect of international cooperation was taken into 
account by conducting interviews with 17 police officers from Albania, Croatia, Lithuania, 
Austria, the Republic of Moldova and Romania in addition to the interviews in Germany. The 
countries were selected based on the extent of their relevance to German investigative authori-
ties, because perpetrators come from these countries or, as in the case of Austria, the situation 
is similar to that of Germany. The organised crime report of the Federal Criminal Police Office 
(BKA, 2016) and discussions with the Federal Criminal Police Office and Europol were con-
sulted to determine the countries. The interviews were conducted on site. The interviewees were 
police officers at the investigative level who already had experience in cooperating with Ger-
man investigative authorities in the area of residential burglaries, but also police officers work-
ing in international cooperation departments.  
The interviews were conducted from December 2016 to November 2017. Access to German 
law enforcement authorities was accomplished via the higher-level authorities, i.e. the interior 
ministries of the federal states and the public prosecutor's offices. Another way of establishing 
contact with interviewees was to arrange contact through experts who had already been inter-
viewed or through existing personal contacts of the researchers. Furthermore, Europol and the 
Federal Criminal Police Office supported the establishment of contacts with police officers 
abroad. The interviewees were free to choose whether the interview should be conducted in 
English or whether a translator should be called in. At the request of the interview participants, 
an interpreter was involved in all interviews. The guiding research questions associated with 
these expert interviews related in part to the knowledge of criminal investigation authorities 
regarding perpetrators.  
Secondly, there was an interest in finding out about the obstacles to criminal investigation in 
this area. To collect expert knowledge on these aspects, the interview guideline included the 
following topics: (1) general investigation process in the case of residential burglary, (2) insti-
tutional procedure and work organisation, (3) perpetrator characteristics and patterns, (4) typi-
cal investigative measures and (5) national and international investigative activities. In addition, 
specific questions were asked in order to gain more thorough knowledge regarding specific 
aspects of the topics mentioned, if the interviewee had not yet dealt with the topic to the desired 
extent (see Kruse, 2015, p. 209 et seq.). A qualitative content analysis method based on Mayring 
(2015) was chosen for the evaluation, whereby the interviews were evaluated using the struc-
turing technique (Mayring, 2015, pp. 65 et seq., 97 et seq.). 
In the following, the legal background relating to the present research topic is presented first. 
This is intended above all to provide a better understanding of the legal and investigative tools 
mentioned in the interviews. This is followed by the results section and divided into three main 
sections. The first section of the results presents the knowledge of German and foreign criminal 
investigation officers about the perpetrators. The second section of the results discusses the 
problems and practical reality of criminal prosecution. The obstacles to criminal investigations 
within Germany and the willingness and experience of German criminal investigative authori-
12 
ties to conduct international criminal investigations are described. Subsequently, the perspec-
tive of foreign police officers is presented regarding international cooperation in general and 
with German investigative authorities in particular.  
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2 Legal background 
As mentioned above, international legal and investigative tools are of particular importance in 
connection with investigations in the area of organised residential burglary. For this reason, and 
to gain a better understanding of the interview excerpts, the current key legal and investigative 
tools are outlined below. At present, the most important and frequently used instruments for 
cross-border prosecution are legal assistance, the use of the Schengen Information System, the 
European Arrest Warrant, the use of the PRÜM database for matching fingerprints and DNA 
traces, Europol's SIENA information channel, Europol's EIS information database, the possi-
bility of operational meetings and joint investigation teams, and the new European Investigation 
Order introduced in 2017. 
2.1 Police and judicial legal assistance 
In principle, the powers of national law enforcement authorities extend to their own national 
borders. If powers are to be extended to foreign states, support from the foreign state is required 
in order to avoid violation of foreign territorial sovereignty. This can be done either by foreign 
authorities taking action themselves or by allowing prosecutions from other states on their ter-
ritory. For Germany, such measures are permissible under the provisions of the Law on Inter-
national Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (IRG). Mutual legal assistance is provided 
based on the procedure to be followed, which may include extradition (§§ 2-42 IRG) as well as 
other criminal prosecution measures such as questioning witnesses and obtaining or issuing 
evidence (§§ 59-67 IRG).  
The procedure is initiated by a request, which can be made either by a court or by the public 
prosecutor, depending on what measures are to be taken. In addition, relevant authorities may 
also provide legal assistance (cf. BeckOK POR NRW 2017, §47 Note 18 et seq.). 
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters is based on the principle of mutual recognition of judg-
ments and decisions and the approximation of the laws of the Member States in different regions 
(see Article 82 AEUV). This cooperation, in particular the coordination of national judicial 
authorities, shall be implemented by Eurojust in accordance with Article 85 AEUV. 
In contrast to this procedure, police legal assistance with regard to the transmission of infor-
mation is provided in cooperation between foreign police authorities. The starting point for such 
cooperation is an existing international agreement, for example the IRG within the EU 
(BeckOK POR NRW 2017, §47 Note 18 et seq.). According to § 92 I IRG, the competent 
authority is obliged to accept and execute requests from police authorities of other Member 
States with regard to information or findings on criminals. The transmission takes place accord-
ing to the same conditions as to a domestic police authority (cf. § 92 I S. 2 IRG). It should be 
emphasised here that police legal assistance under § 92 II IRG may only incorporate the find-
ings in court proceedings if the competent licensing authority consents to their use. 
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2.2 Europol communication software SIENA 
The "secure information exchange network application" (abbreviation: SIENA) is an intelli-
gence information system made available by Europol to all Member States of the European 
Union since 2009 for the direct exchange of police information on a bilateral or multilateral 
basis without the need for a formal request. Third countries may also have a SIENA connection 
if they conclude a cooperation agreement with Europol (Bundesdrucksache 18/7246 p. 2). Po-
lice information relating to persons or specific cases can be fed through SIENA and answered 
directly by another Member State or user state. 
2.3 Europol Information System EIS 
The Europol Information System (EIS) was launched in 2005 as a database for police infor-
mation. This includes personal data, DNA and dactyloscopic data of suspects as well as data 
relating to criminal offences such as the time and place of the crime (Article 12 of the Europol 
Decision). The new Europol Regulation is also designed to give all German states access to EIS 
(Article 11 of the Europol Decision). Prior to the new regulation, a contact point in one country, 
such as the BKA for Germany, could access the information (Sieber et al., 2014, p. 885), alt-
hough access has meanwhile been considerably extended. In contrast to the existing possibility 
of gaining access to databases under the Prüm Treaty, information in the EIS database must be 
accessed separately. 
2.4 Schengen Information System (SIS) 
The Schengen Information System (SIS) was introduced following the abolition of internal 
border controls in order to enable searches to be carried out at any location rather than at the 
local level (Schober, 2017, p. 93). Pursuant to Article 92 I of the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement (CISA), a common automated information system has been set up to al-
low Schengen partners access to national searches for persons or objects. The SIS may be used 
to search for persons, for example, if they are to be arrested or extradited (Art. 95 CISA), to 
prevent danger (Art. 97 CISA) or if they are to face a prison sentence (Art. 98 CISA). In contrast 
to INPOL, the German police information system, only current searches can be entered and 
viewed in the SIS, and no information on completed investigations or detention periods may be 
entered or viewed (Schober, 2017, p. 95). Pursuant to Art. 95 I CISA, the judicial authorities 
are responsible for a reconciliation or a search for the purpose of arrest. Technical implemen-
tation of the SIS occurs at the Federal Criminal Police Office. 
2.5 European arrest warrant 
The aim of the European arrest warrant is to facilitate the extradition of persons between Mem-
ber States. This is not an arrest warrant according to the German understanding, but rather an 
investigative tool (Sieber et al., 2014, p. 669). This is issued based on a domestic arrest warrant 
and published in the police information systems of each country. It also contains the request for 
extradition if suspects are arrested (§§ 78 et seq. IRG). European arrest warrants can be dealt 
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with directly between the competent judicial authorities of the Member States and are therefore 
a cornerstone for the mutual recognition of judicial decisions (Sieber et al., 2014, p. 663).  
The Framework Decision on which the European arrest warrant is based entered into force in 
August 2002. A variety of international treaties previously in existence were replaced by the 
Framework Decision. All Member States have now implemented the Framework Decision in 
their national laws (Sieber et al., 2014, p. 662). 
2.6 Data reconciliation using PRÜM 
The Prüm Treaty of 2005 contains provisions on data reconciliation, particularly in the case of 
cross-border crime (BGBl. II 2006, p. 626). The Prüm Treaty obliges Member States to estab-
lish databases for DNA analysis, dactyloscopy (fingerprinting) and vehicle and holder data for 
automated comparison between Member States (Articles 3, 9 and 12 Prüm Treaty; Sieber et al., 
2014, p. 751).  The Prüm Treaty was introduced into the European legal framework by the 
Council Decision of 23 June 2008 (see Council Decision 2008/615/JI) and is therefore applica-
ble law in the EU Member States. 
An anonymized procedure is used to match DNA traces or fingerprint traces. When a DNA 
trace is entered into the Prüm database, the so-called "hit/no-hit procedure" checks whether a 
corresponding DNA profile already exists in the database. If this is the case, the state in which 
the DNA profile is available transmits the necessary personal data to the requesting state via 
the process of legal assistance (Sieber et al. 2014, p. 891). 
2.7 Operational Meetings and Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) 
Europol offers states the opportunity to exchange information on specific issues and groups of 
perpetrators in the form of “Operational Meetings”. In these meetings, Europol provides the 
physical premises and any necessary translation services, covers travel expenses and offers in-
sight into relevant findings from Europol's databases. Based on such meetings, the formation 
of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) can be aimed for. 
A JIT is an international association of national investigation teams consisting of police and/or 
judicial representatives from at least two European Member States or Member States and third 
countries who have joined forces for a specific period of time to conduct joint investigations in 
a specific subject area (Europol, 2017b). Such associations are particularly relevant in proceed-
ings with particular cross-border implications (cf. Art. 13 I lit. a and b European Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters). A major advantage of a JIT is that, according to § 93 
II IRG, direct exchange of information is possible without formal legal assistance, while pre-
serving the subsequent judicial admissibility of the evidence or information. A JIT is based on 
a contractual agreement between the participating states. Europol or Eurojust may also be in-
volved in the implementation of a JIT and provide assistance. In addition, there is a network for 
JITs operated by Europol and Eurojust which provides advice and answers to questions or 
guidelines regarding the establishment of JITs (cf. Art. 13 I lit. a and b European Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters). 
16 
2.8 European Investigation Order (EIO) 
Since 22 May 2017, the European Investigation Order (EIO) has provided a new legal mecha-
nism for the prosecution of cross-border crimes. The EIO was created in the provisions of §§ 
91 a et seq. IRG regarding the cross-border acquisition and recognition of evidence in criminal 
proceedings on the basis of the Directive on the European Investigation Order (Di-
rective/2014/41/EU) and is intended to significantly reform the aspects of freedom, security 
and justice for the European area. The particularity of the EIO is that it creates a uniform pro-
cedure for obtaining evidence among the Member States of the European Union as well as for 
producing evidence more quickly and simply (Brahms & Gut, 2017, p. 389). Consequently, the 
EIO replaces previous European Union provisions regarding special mutual legal assistance 
insofar as the EIO contains relevant provisions in this regard. Apart from this, the previous legal 
mechanisms remain applicable (Art. 34 I Council Directive EIO). Uniformity of evidence is to 
be achieved using a standardised form which is identical in all Member States. 
Another particularity of the EIO is that the state receiving it may only refuse to enforce the 
investigation under specific conditions listed in Article 11 of the EIO Directive. In principle, 
mutual assistance under the EIO may only be provided if all other conditions are met that are 
necessary for German courts or competent authorities to pursue legal assistance (Brahms & 
Gut, 2017, p. 392). In addition, the EIO aims to strengthen communication between authorities 
by imposing an obligation to inform the competent body immediately in the event of formal 
obstacles faced by the EIO (Brahms & Gut, 2017, p. 393). This is to prevent requests for legal 
assistance from being unanswered or delayed (Brahms & Gut, 2017). Judicial authorities or 
courts are responsible for final rulings related to the EIO (§ 91 j II IRG). 
 17 
3 Findings 
The results of the expert interviews are presented below. First, knowledge about the perpetrators 
of organised residential burglary will be discussed in more detail (3.1). To this end, the findings 
of foreign police officers are also included.4 The next section of the results presents the experi-
ence gained through international cooperation with criminal investigation authorities in other 
countries (3.2). The results of the foreign expert interviews are then presented (3.3). 
3.1 Perpetrators in the field of organised residential burglary 
In the following section, the socio-demographic characteristics of the perpetrators will be dis-
cussed in more detail as identified by the interviewed experts in the field of organised residential 
burglary. 
3.1.1 Socio-demographic characteristics and social situation 
The German police officers and public prosecutors surveyed estimate the number of organised 
groups of perpetrators in Germany to be low. These are typically men aged between 30 - 50 
years who have known each other for a certain period of time and who commit the crimes 
jointly. These are people who have been the subject of criminal investigations for a long time 
and who might know each other from prison, for example. In addition, albeit rarely, there are 
regions in Germany where gangs of young people work together to commit burglaries: 
"But in [state in the north of Germany] the other scenario is actually more typical, 
where you have youth gangs in the broadest sense, so there were, there are some 
cases, where they were actually young people and adolescents, but in terms of the age 
group they were mostly up to the age of 25, at most one person in the group around 
the age of 30, and in this age group, the people in [state in the north of Germany] are 
all relatively well connected with each other" (Prosecutor, AK04) 
All the interviews emphasized that organised groups of perpetrators in Germany do not account 
for a large share of the crimes. Apart from the aforementioned gangs, German perpetrators are 
mainly involved in drug-related crime, i.e. they are addicts (narcotics or gambling addictions). 
Usually these are individual offenders who try to break into flats in multi-family houses within 
a short period of time. The perpetrators are described as unprofessional, which means that they 
tend to leave traces: 
"And they're not as conspiratorial as our foreign perpetrators, they just go into the 
flat or the house, they might even use the fridge, drink from the beer bottle, I've seen 
cases where that happened, and then we have their DNA. A foreign trained perpetra-
tor wouldn't do that. And what we also often had with the Germans, you see them 
hours later on video surveillance in a bank or shop because they use stolen bank cards. 
I’ve actually never had a case like that with a foreigner." (Prosecutor, GW02) 
                                                 
4 Quotations from foreign police officers are identified after the quotation by naming the country in parentheses. 
Quotations without country affiliation refer to police officers and public prosecutors from Germany. 
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The origin of foreign perpetrators involved in organised residential burglary can largely be at-
tributed to Eastern Europe, especially the Balkan states. These include perpetrators from Ro-
mania, Georgia, Albania, Serbia, but also from north-eastern Europe such as Lithuania. In ad-
dition, some burglars from South America, especially Chile, have been identified. As with the 
German perpetrators, the majority of these are young men between the ages of 20 and 30. These 
are not always so-called travelling perpetrators, i.e. persons who enter Germany to commit the 
crime, but also some who have lived in Germany for many years. 
Their social situation is often characterised by difficult economic conditions. Among other 
things, unemployment plays a role here: 
"They're usually not high-level criminals, that is, professional criminals. According 
to the statistics, the most frequent motive for crime involved social reasons, and 70 to 
80 percent of the perpetrators are unemployed. In the last two years, so I am talking 
about statistics for 2015/2016, we have seen an increase in the number of minors as 
perpetrators”. (Police officer, Albania) 
In this context, Germany presents an opportunity to obtain money from property crimes, but it 
is also associated with the hope of better prospects in life or a better job: 
"Germany is a country where the labour force is paid or remunerated better than in 
other European countries such as Italy or Spain, where Moldovan citizens used to 
travel. (...) For Moldovan citizens, it is a rich country with many opportunities, job 
prospects (...). But on the other hand, there are organised groups that have a clear 
purpose. And since Germany is so rich and has many rich citizens, it is also very 
interesting for the other side, of course." (Police officer, Republic of Moldova) 
One particularity with regard to perpetrator patterns is the phenomenon of women as perpetra-
tors in organised residential burglary. Women are rarely involved in organised residential bur-
glaries. In some cases, they play a supporting role by driving the getaway vehicle, acting as 
"guards" during the crime, or exploring possible crime locations in advance. Especially when 
moving around in residential areas, women are more inconspicuous than men, either together 
with a man as a presumed couple or with another woman as a friend: 
 "(...) these are sometimes female friends or girlfriends who get involved, and who 
may be responsible for the vehicle, or who are responsible for the address, let’s say, 
making sure they even have a place to live and where the car might be registered. But 
speaking of women who act as the perpetrators of actual crimes, well, I don’t want to 
rule it out, but it almost never happens in this area, to be perfectly honest. We some-
times have them among ethnic minorities, for instance gypsies, to put it quite simply. 
Women are sometimes involved, even in residential burglaries, but when it comes to 
the groups of perpetrators I mentioned who come from the Western Balkans, that is 
hardly the case, I’m not aware of any." (Police officer, AK10) 
However, women can be found as burglars, as mentioned in the interview excerpt, especially 
in connection with so-called family clans. These are often Sinti and Roma people, mostly from 
countries in the Balkan region. In these perpetrator groups, women are also actively involved 
in committing crimes, i.e. they are also responsible for break-ins. In addition to gender, perpe-
trators from family clans exhibit another socio-demographic peculiarity. In this context, the 
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surveyed experts have also identified minors, especially children, who are involved in the bur-
glaries: 
"in [state in southern Germany] in [city in southern Germany] there were groups of 
Roma girls working, there were thousands of burglaries perpetrated by actual chil-
dren as well as young people" (Police officer, GW10) 
The experts also described how the children and young people are forced to give the stolen 
goods to their parents: 
"(...) it starts with the children, which [name of another police officer] already men-
tioned, that they are committing crimes at the age of 12, 13, 14, and at that point they 
are not quite so professional. You might get them after ten or twelve crimes, and 
they’re aware that the first time you get arrested you are put on probation, which 
means they can’t use those same people again. So these crimes are committed by ad-
olescents and the money is then delivered to the parents, to the families." (Police of-
ficer, GW03) 
Furthermore, in some regions of Germany young perpetrators were identified among the local 
perpetrators. Although they also act in groups, they are involved in less organised burglary 
patterns. 
3.1.2 Offences committed in countries of origin 
The majority of police officers from Eastern European countries who took part in the present 
survey reported that most perpetrators of burglaries in Germany had already attracted police 
attention in their countries of origin. It is typically pointed out that the perpetrators of property 
crime are "loyal to their crimes": 
"First, there are criminals who have committed similar crimes in the Republic of Mol-
dova who have been previously convicted and who continue to commit the same type 
of crime. So if they travel to Germany or Italy for this purpose, they are travelling 
only to commit burglaries or car theft or for another category of crimes or a different 
category." (Police officer, Republic of Moldova) 
Police in Romania, Croatia and Lithuania also noticed crimes committed in the home countries 
of perpetrators: 
“This is because organised crime groups are specialised, and the ones that are in-
volved in vehicle thefts, for example, will not get involved with residential burglaries." 
(Police officer, Lithuania) 
Perpetrators not only tend to stick to the same crime, but typically specialise in a modus op-
erandi or follow a similar procedure when committing crimes. Often the perpetrators start com-
mitting break-ins in their own country, but then move away due to police investigations in their 
home country and start committing burglaries in other countries: 
"Well, they're in Moldova, they've committed a crime here, the police have already 
got their sights on them, so to speak. And to avoid being observed further (...) or even 
arrested by the Moldovan police, they emigrate." (Police officer, Republic of Mol-
dova) 
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This kind of displacement effect is also observed in other countries such as Lithuania. However, 
this development also occurs the other way around. For example, the police in Albania report 
that perpetrators also commit burglaries in Albania after they had difficulties committing crimes 
abroad or staying abroad: 
"And the ones who have been abroad and then commit crimes here are usually people 
who were no longer able to live abroad for whatever reason, either they were deported 
or declared persona non grata or they were not able to buy a fake passport to live and 
stay abroad in some way or they know that if they do at some point, if they attract 
attention there again, they risk facing punishments and so on. These are some reasons 
why these people come to Albania and then commit crimes here." (Police officer, Al-
bania) 
With regard to Albanian perpetrators, the migration movements in the 1990s constitute a par-
ticularity. For example, the Albanian police have determined that a significant share of Alba-
nian perpetrators are Albanian nationals who were born in another country: 
"And from previous experience, the perpetrators are often people who were born and 
raised abroad, i.e. Albanians who were born abroad, not here. Of course, these are 
not absolute values. But that's a significant part of it." (Police officer, Albania) 
This in turn is associated with the difficult social situation and high levels of unemployment. 
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3.1.3 Forms of organisation 
The German definition of organised crime has some particularities. One of the specific aspects 
of the definition is that it refers to the way the perpetrators work together. The prerequisite is 
that at least two people are working together on a collaborative basis. The reference to collab-
orative action, but also variant a) of three different types of variants the German definition of 
organised crime, "using commercial or business-like structures", make the existence of a hier-
archical structure within a perpetrator group a key factor for its classification as organised 
crime.  
For this reason, the present study is also interested in examining the way in which perpetrators 
are organised and, in particular, the extent to which a hierarchical structure exists. The guiding 
question here is how the perpetrators are acting as a group, to what extent there are organised 
levels of command and execution, or whether residential burglaries are committed collabora-
tively.  
The evaluation of the expert interviews shows that the groups of perpetrators described are quite 
different in terms of the existence or power of hierarchical structures. For the purposes of cate-
gorising structures, these differences were grouped and subdivided into the following six or-
ganisational forms of perpetrators:  
 Loose networks 
 Gangs with a flat hierarchy 
 Gangs with a strict hierarchy  
 Family clans 
 Exploitative conditions 
 Mafia structures 
The degree of hierarchy represents a principle of order that is reflected by the sequence in which 
these organisational forms are listed: while structures consisting of loose networks and ac-
quaintances do not exhibit any hierarchical order, conditions involving exploitation as well as 
mafia groups do exhibit hierarchies, some of them very strongly. In the following, the forms of 
organisation will be discussed in more detail. 
3.1.3.1 Loose networks 
Perpetrators who commit residential burglaries in loose network relationships do not belong to 
a fixed group of persons or a gang. Instead, they know various other perpetrators with whom 
they commit burglaries in varying arrangements. One participant in the expert interview also 
described such loose networks as "fluid masses": 
"These alliances of criminals, of burglars, they are sometimes like a fluid mass. As 
you just said, someone will come along, then someone will be gone, then they need a 
driver, whoops, he got arrested, then the next one will come along.” (Police officer, 
GW05) 
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In Austria, too, there is increasing evidence of loose networks of acquaintances among perpe-
trators: 
"Of course, there are Georgian groups of perpetrators, for example, where I really 
see this organisational structure. In the broad range of standard cases, I see what 
tend to be called rather loose networks, people who just get together, now they are 
committing some burglaries, then they go back. Some of these people then travel to 
another country and also commit burglaries there, but often not in these deep networks 
(...)" (Police officer, Austria) 
Above all, division of labour plays an important role here, as already indicated in the section 
above. Depending on what is currently needed, which property is involved or what particular 
circumstances are present, people will come together to commit the crime: 
"So of course, also behind this kind of crimes there are people, but many of them work 
in a network as I understand it. So just like we network with each other, I know some-
one who helps me if I am having trouble, if I have a problem somewhere, that's ulti-
mately the same with them." (Police officer, GW05) 
However, loose networks are not only defined by perpetrators who come together like service 
providers. Actually, loose networks also exist between people who more or less accidentally 
commit burglaries together without having any specialised functions: 
"Those were, if you like, networks, and in these networks there were, let’s say, several 
people who decided relatively spontaneously to commit crimes on their own account 
and then, depending on availability, recruited various other people to commit this 
crime. So a gang is made up of, let’s say, not four specific people, only one of them 
was always involved, but the other two or three, I’d say, they varied constantly." (Po-
lice officer, AK10) 
Regardless of whether there is a division of labour or not, offences committed as a group exhibit 
no organisational hierarchy in the form of a command structure or similar structure. There is no 
one person in particular who plans the deeds alone and instructs others to carry out the individ-
ual steps or who has any other authority to issue orders to others. This is also described in the 
following interview excerpt: 
"So with the Romanian perpetrators I had, there was more of a loose connection, so 
they were brothers and wives who were somehow involved, but it wasn’t the case that 
there was a fixed group or one of them was the boss or anything. Instead they would 
just loosely meet up and drive off to commit a break-in. You couldn't say they had a 
system." (Prosecutor, AK07) 
The perpetrators sometimes meet shortly before the crime is committed or spontaneously decide 
who will head out together. They know each other through friends or other acquaintances or 
from other aspects of their everyday social environment, as described, for example, by a police 
officer in relation to Albanian perpetrators: 
"(...) if I may address the concrete case, these were Albanians and, as you said, I 
believe that Albanian ethnicity alone (P2: is enough) and I think that was enough, and 
then they were in a WhatsApp group or in some other online group and someone asks 
'Who has time and feels like it tonight' and then they get together in groups that might 
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not even really belong together. Some of them work together, some of them live to-
gether, it’s true, or they live in one place and they know each other, talk to each other 
and then loose connections are established and they get started. And that alone is 
enough, at least in this case." (Police officer, AK17) 
The Lithuanian police also describes crimes committed by groups based on long-standing ac-
quaintances and growing up together: 
"These are mostly people from a city, an area, a region, who live there. They know 
each other and, depending on their level, sometimes there is a clear hierarchy, but 
there is no kinship, no connection with religion or anything. These are usually people 
living in one area. Maybe they grew up together, maybe they had the same hobbies or 
did sports together and they know each other. As far as the groups in the residential 
burglary area are concerned, they are not particularly highly organised. They are 
specialised, it’s true, but as far as organisation is concerned, this is not as marked as 
for other crimes." (Police officer, Lithuania) 
There are also indications that a shared background or ethnicity is the linking characteristic. 
This creates the basis for a kind of “community” in which people network and communicate. 
Loose structures have been identified even among perpetrators from South America, for whom 
even strictly organised groups would seem plausible due to the higher travel expenses involved: 
“It also seems to be similar for Chileans, so you have lots of people acting inde-
pendently who then come together, mostly depending on the situation, to form little 
groups of two to four people" (Police officer, AK09) 
Accordingly, the perpetrators themselves do not receive instructions as to when and where to 
commit their crimes and are free to dispose of what they steal. According to the experts, this 
has also been observed in arrangements where certain support services such as travel money or 
accommodation have been provided to make the trip possible: 
"And this whole package, along with the initial travel money, costs all of two, 3,000 
euros, so you have to have that much before you can even get to Europe. Probably, 
this is mostly provided by the families, or if you've already been to Europe a few times 
you might have that amount of money, or Uncle José hands it over so you can learn 
how to commit burglaries and move around Europe. But there are probably also fi-
nanciers, who probably advance this sum against corresponding amounts of credit. 
These are just vague statements. But there’s no more organisation behind it than that." 
(Police officer, AK09) 
According to the interviewees, the reason why a large number of residential burglaries are com-
mitted by people acting in the loose structures described lies in the simplicity of committing 
burglaries: 
"This is not a particularly demanding crime either, and the sale of gold jewellery is 
not a particular problem now either if you look at all the places that buy gold here. 
Otherwise, as I said, even the less resourceful do not face particularly great chal-
lenges now." (Police officer, AK09) 
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Committing the crime itself is not complicated and is easy to learn, and selling or using stolen 
goods does not require any contact to specialised dealers or other difficult access to particular 
markets. Jewellery and cash, the most common stolen goods, are easy to utilise. In pawnshops 
and buying and selling shops, there are no major obstacles to selling jewellery without provid-
ing your own personal details or similar information. In this respect, the crime of residential 
burglary is a property offence that is easy to commit and yet is associated with high expectation 
of reward. Other property offences, such as the theft of expensive equipment or equipment in 
theft from lorry transporters, so-called tarpaulin slitters, may require more preparation and a 
corresponding organisation of people who receive the stolen goods for further sale. In this re-
spect, many crimes related to residential burglaries are committed in the loose structures de-
scribed. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that this collaborative approach is less professional or 
successful than crimes committed by fixed gangs. The police also describe that these changing 
groups of perpetrators can present particular difficulties for the police investigation: 
“Well, as to that, it can be explained just like that, as I said, there were nine of them, 
always acting in groups of three. But it was not always the same three: today A, B and 
C would act together and D, E and F, and the next day is F with G and H is with A 
and so on. So they kept switching  every day. In this case, they were never always in 
the same groups as before and they were not committing ongoing joint crimes, because 
there were different people involved." (Police officer, GW04) 
On the one hand, there is the difficulty of proving that an ongoing joint crime has been com-
mitted. On the other hand, the phenomenon of a changing arrangement of perpetrators also 
involves the problem of attributing and proving that specific people committed specific crimes. 
3.1.3.2 Gangs with a flat hierarchy 
The second form of organisation, gangs with a flat hierarchy, are fixed groups. In this case, 
residential burglaries are mainly carried out by the same group of people.  
"With the Bulgarians that I had, they were a really solid group, and they were always 
all together at the crime scenes. So they weren’t splitting up, they always drove off 
together, committed their crimes, took the money and then split it like that. That was 
a fixed group. And now my Albanians I have seen, in this case, there is one person 
connected with several groups spread all over Germany. The groups know each other, 
but the one perpetrator is the person linking everything together, and then he commits 
crimes with these different little groups. It is not the case that these groups commit 
deeds together with the other groups, they only ever work together with this one per-
petrator." (Prosecutor, AK07) 
The fixed gangs typically consist of 3 to 5 people. As mentioned by the public prosecutor in-
terviewed here, some of the groups also know each other and perpetrators in one gang occa-
sionally participate in burglaries committed by other gangs, though the gangs themselves do 
not unite to commit crimes. The fact that fixed perpetrator groups also involve a variety of 
alternating members was also expressed by other interview participants: 
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"There is a core of three or four people who are involved in almost all the crimes and 
yet for the majority of the proceedings the number of suspects grows larger. There 
would always be cases where you were dealing with 20 to 30 crimes by the end of it, 
but you were ultimately looking at eight different suspects, or even between ten and 
15, or as many as 20 suspects.” (Prosecutor, AK04) 
In this respect, fixed gangs make use of loose networks and acquaintances and thereby involve 
various other perpetrators according to necessity and opportunity. However, there is less fixed 
division of different roles and division of labour involved here. Instead, the crime is planned as 
a group and committed together and then the stolen goods are divided up equally. There is no 
strict hierarchy in this form of organisation. 
This has been observed, albeit not as an exclusive form of organisation, by the Lithuanian po-
lice, for example: 
"And there is another category, small mobile groups that travel around with four to, 
say, eight people who then commit a crime and then stay together for several weeks 
on the move. They don't have clear leaders, one of them is often the coordinator, but 
he doesn't break into the building himself, but he might lend them instruments and 
tools." (Police officer, Lithuania) 
German police officers describe it in a similar way: 
"(...) essentially, they were all involved. It might be true that one of the gang did not 
come along that day, maybe did a bit of scoping out before, that kind of thing; but the 
central backer as the leader and planner of the whole thing who only orders the others 
to go out, this did not crystallise in our proceedings and in fact I am quite sure that 
this never existed, because telecommunications surveillance showed that the stolen 
goods were divided up and similar things were arranged, discussed and you learned 
who ended up with what. In the end, there was no share left for any backers or similar 
individuals, and this would also be a way for perpetrators to claim a bit of protection 
assertion, if they could make themselves seem harmless by saying that they had only 
worked as henchmen for someone else. For defence counsel it would also be a clever 
statement, but these kind of statements were not made. In this respect, I would not 
assume that there was a typical backer involved in these proceedings in [state in north-
ern Germany]." (Police officer, AK04) 
The police of the Republic of Moldova describe that the perpetrators commit break-ins together, 
but try to arrive and leave separately: 
"In most cases, these are organised groups that have committed a crime or a series of 
crimes here and then do the same in other European countries. They make their de-
partures separately or they travel separately. One by plane, the other by car, another 
by train. Depending on how they decide. So in most cases, they are groups, but they 
leave separately." (Police officer, Republic of Moldova) 
As already pointed out, there is no fixed hierarchy and command structure in these gangs. Nev-
ertheless, there may well be people who assume a decision-making role. However, there is still 
no strict hierarchy in place, as described in the following interview section: 
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"(...) they come together for a specific project, forming gangs of various sizes, some 
of these are coordinated democratically of course, some of them involve a grey emi-
nence who might set the tone in this gang to a certain degree, based on age and expe-
rience, but that’s really all. And it just wouldn’t make sense for the perpetrators to 
belong to this kind of organisation, because it has no added value for them and they 
would actually lose out accordingly." (Police officer, AK09) 
Furthermore, this section expresses an assumption that perpetrators of residential burglaries 
have less to gain from being strongly subordinate to others. The reason for this is again the 
simplicity of committing crimes and using stolen goods. Nevertheless, the experts that were 
surveyed also observe gangs with strict hierarchies, as described in the following section. 
3.1.3.3 Gangs with a strict hierarchy 
Gangs with a strict hierarchy are characterised by different levels. In the simplest cases, there 
is a group of people who commit the burglaries, also called the working level, and a manage-
ment level that directs the crimes and decides on the perpetrators on the working level. There 
may also be a middle level made up of people who guarantee certain basic conditions such as 
accommodation and concrete communication with the perpetrators on the working level and 
who are in contact with the direct decision-makers. The direct decision-makers are not typically 
present in Germany, but control the crimes from their home countries, for example by tele-
phone: 
"(...) here there are not one, two or three perpetrators ultimately acting alone. All of 
them were more or less employed in certain territorial areas by a higher-ranked per-
son in the hierarchy who also maintains constant contact with the perpetrators by 
phone. We were able to work this out based on various measures involving telecom-
munications monitoring (...). So this telecommunications monitoring activity where 
we repeatedly observe that there is a contact, acting as division manager or regional 
manager or whatever you want to call it, and where the people acting on the ground 
repeatedly request assistance, saying 'With the people I have here I will only be able 
to commit certain crimes now, for example shoplifting, because they are simply not 
qualified enough. We need you to send me other people so that I can also-' sometimes 
the phone calls don’t make it entirely clear, because they are also careful, they will 
say 'so to do the renovations I need-, we want to do some more renovations’, when 
they say renovate, they mean breaking into single-family homes (...)" (Police officer, 
AK02) 
The following section of the interview clearly shows that some groups of perpetrators with a 
strict hierarchy also exhibit a high degree of fluctuation in the "working level". The people 
committing the crimes are frequently exchanged and replaced. 
"Even if it's gang crime or maybe even organised crime, they don't send out the lead-
ers. They recruit people who commit the burglaries, that’s the work level. Then  the 
logistical level and the management level follow. These are isolated from each other 
and are also from the same ethnic groups. At the working level that’s not the case, this 
can be seen in all syndicates, that is, they are selling at street level, it could be some-
one, what do I know, from Nigeria or from Germany, but they are only selling at this 
level, while the specialists, the logistics people and all that, they are from the same 
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ethnic groups. They won't let anyone in either. But we're fiddling around with symp-
toms here. In our investigations, even if we sometimes come to the conclusion that 
they are acting somewhere else, we can’t get at the root of it, to the client, if organised 
crime is actually involved. They're based in Poland or somewhere." (Police officer, 
AK16) 
In this part of the discussion as well, division of labour and the hierarchy within these groups 
are emphasised. The organisation consists of a core of people who take over the planning, lo-
gistics and recruitment of perpetrators who commit the crimes. The highest level of hierarchy 
is not based in the countries where the burglaries are committed, but instead in the relevant 
country of origin. There is often no real connection between this level and the person commit-
ting the crime. This presents a particular challenge for the police, because even when investi-
gating the burglars, further prosecution of the so-called "backers" is difficult. 
The hierarchy levels can also differ by certain skills. Thus, the Lithuanian police describe that 
the people who commit the crimes often have limited knowledge or foreign language skills. 
They are dependent on others who plan their residence and similar considerations. The highest 
levels of the hierarchy, the so-called backers, are predominantly well educated: 
"The lowest level representatives in these groups, these are the so-called actors, they 
can't speak foreign languages, they don't know their way around the cities, they can 
only break in, do their job and leave the house. The core is made up of young, previ-
ously convicted persons between the ages of 18 and 35, these are the higher-level 
perpetrators who can speak foreign languages because English, French or German 
are taught in our schools (...). As for the representatives of this higher level, we some-
times have cases where the organisers are very well educated people with a university 
degree, sometimes with several degrees and it is even more difficult to identify, detect, 
uncover, find (...) these intellectual people.” (Police officer, Lithuania) 
Typically, the people at this higher level are not located in Germany. 
3.1.3.4 Family clans 
So-called family clans represent a particular form of organisation among fixed gangs with a 
strict hierarchy. These mostly consist of Sinti and Roma people. Typically, most members of 
the family are involved in committing the burglaries. The Croatian police estimate that over 
half of the mobile perpetrators who also commit burglaries in Croatia are Roma people organ-
ised in family clans. The execution and organisation of crimes and distribution of the stolen 
goods is determined by the boss of the clan, who is usually an older family member. He or she 
also decides which individuals take on which tasks and exerts pressure on the family members 
to implement these decisions. For criminal investigation authorities, the large number of perpe-
trators involved and the patterns exhibited by the "backers" present difficulties. In the following 
interview, the experts report how they learned more about a family clan when a member opened 
up during the interrogation and was offered a witness protection program: 
"The backer was, how shall we say, a higher-level elder Roma who sent his children 
and his nephews and other members of his family to commit burglaries and then, by 
the carrot and stick approach, made them continue committing burglaries and deliv-
ering most of the stolen goods to him. Without his testimony and witness protection, 
28 
we would never have gotten to him, we would have thought it was a small gang, a 
group of people. We wouldn’t have known what is actually behind it, namely fixed 
structures where the boss just said 'You go here and break-in there, this is how you 
will proceed, you have to bring me this much' and if everything went well, they were 
given generous shares of the stolen goods, if they did not bring enough, there were 
punishments. (...) And he also had his contacts with people who resell stolen goods 
and so on. I'd look at that more like organised crime, but without the witness protec-
tion, without the statements about the head of the family, of course, there was always 
this idea when it comes to Roma people that things worked a certain way, but most of 
the time you don't get any statements." (Police officer, AK03) 
As described, in this context, the stolen goods are handed over and the clan leader decides on 
their further use and distribution. The extent of the power held by these people also becomes 
clear in the further remarks of a public prosecutor regarding the same family clan: 
“We also used telephone surveillance against this backer that the French operated 
for us, yes. And it was also interesting that he was known in France, this Roma leader, 
who was a contact person for the French police in disputes, problems with the Roma 
and of course he also had the power to rat out unpleasant group members to the 
French police" (Prosecutor, AK03) 
As mentioned here, the possibilities for punishing family members who, for example, did not 
comply with instructions, could extend as far as naming these people to the police so that they 
can be prosecuted. 
A clear hierarchical structure of family clans is also observed by other experts surveyed. For 
example, one police officer reports how, when the boss was detained, leadership shifted to the 
next level, his daughter:  
"With the Romanians, for example, I know this very well, back then with [name of an 
investigation team] the main suspect was [name of the suspect] and with the assistance 
of telecommunications surveillance we once listened to a conversation  of his daugh-
ter, and then she said to a Romanian burglar, ‘You don’t seem to know who is in 
charge here'. So here the command has clearly been passed from papa, who is still in 
the correctional facility at the moment, (laughs) to his little daughter." (Police officer, 
AK05) 
While women are rather rare as burglars, they are frequently present as part of the organisational 
form of family clans. 
“By now we’ve learned some background information, that these criminals are sent 
out by the clans, by these family clans, and while the men are responsible for organ-
ising this and so on, the women or the girls are responsible for getting money this way 
as well, not until they have children, but actually until their own children are also at 
an age where they can commit burglaries. Then they've done their job, and then they're 
out. You probably can't generalise that either, but that’s ultimately the pattern more 
or less." (Police officer, AK09) 
The roles that women play within the family and in committing crimes are very diverse. For 
instance, not only do they sell the stolen goods, but they are often also involved in committing 
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the crimes. The Croatian police also observed an increasing number of women as leaders. Ger-
man investigators have also identified women as decision-makers who occupy leading positions 
within the family: 
"Well, women play a big role. We also had women who were just pawning stolen 
goods all the time so their partner’s name would be kept out of it. It is plausible to say 
that women, especially older women, have the dominant role in our Roma investiga-
tions. They're more or less wearing the pants. That’s always the way it is. I have been 
seeing this for more than 20 years, even in all these proceedings in other federal states 
that I'm familiar with, women play the deciding role, who goes out with whom, where 
and how, right down to the distribution of stolen goods, that's how it's handled. And 
they manage the assets." (Police officer, GW10) 
On the other hand, there are also family clans in which women play a less emancipated role. 
For example, they are appraised at a certain value for arranged marriages depending on how 
well they perform residential burglaries. Furthermore, they are sometimes put under massive 
pressure; for instance, their children are withheld from them and only returned when a certain 
sum is brought in. Nevertheless, the family is their primary and often only reference group, 
which prevents them from breaking away from this group: 
“Of course, they have already gone through a difficult ordeal, they learned this from 
the bottom up and they are absolute professionals in their field, and this is actually 
the only implication in terms of preventing crimes, because they don't talk to authori-
ties, they won’t side with the authorities, they don't want to leave their clans either, 
because they are often put under pressure within the clan, let’s say, their children are 
taken away or something like that and you only get them back again if you do X and 
Y. "That's often the case with these clans of women, and you have to look at it from 
this perspective (Police officer, GW04) 
In addition to women as perpetrators, another specific feature in the context of family clans is 
that children and young people are also explicitly included in committing the crimes: 
“What really stands out in the context of telephone surveillance is that the whole fam-
ily is actually involved, which is rather unusual. For example, if we look at drug-
related crime, I was monitoring this weekend and yesterday there was a crying mother 
on the phone who was totally distraught because her son had been dealing drugs. It 
really is the case with Roma people that everyone is involved, from the smallest tod-
dler to the grandmother, which I have to say I find frightening. Then there's a five-
year-old kid on the phone who says: ‘It’s easy to break into DM' or at Schlecker I 
think it was, they don’t have cameras, or: ‘Bring me a gold ring’. This is the same all 
the way up to the grandmother, they are all talking on the phone, really everyone, 
whether they were involved in the concrete burglaries or not, everyone knows what is 
going on. They even have their own language to talk about it, using words like ‘they’re 
going for a walk' or ‘they’re going to work’, ‘they’re walking’, ‘they’re taking a drive 
through the villages’, and I really don't know anyone, or any ethnic group, who has 
their own words to describe burglaries or rounds of theft, whatever is involved. It’s 
very striking." (Prosecutor, AK15) 
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In this section, it becomes evident that committing crimes is normalised within the described 
family groups. The children are socialised in an environment where it is commonplace to com-
mit burglary and where there is also lively communication about this between the family mem-
bers. However, the role of children is by no means passive; they are not merely witnessing or 
hearing about these everyday practices. In fact, they are also involved in the crimes or are ex-
pected to participate in the burglaries or other thefts or to commit them with other children and 
young people. From the experts' point of view, the main reason for this is that they are below 
the age of criminal responsibility: 
Prosecutor: “Their value is actually determined by their age. Because of course when 
people are arrested, of course, the children always try to say they are below the age 
of criminal responsibility. Then they always say they live in [big city in the west of 
Germany] at the campsite, so they are taken to the youth protection centre, it’s a re-
volving door, they are released and then picked up by adult relatives, it’s true, who 
then have to prove they are adults, because they are always providing different per-
sonal information. First they have to get a hand appraisal to be able to say for sure: 
yes, he is older than 14, and that is not so easy. Actually the children are used as tools 
(P1: also), an adult perpetrator drives them to the crime scene and drops them off and 
they commit the burglary, and if they get caught, what happens to them? Nothing." 
(AK15) 
Police officer: "Exactly. And if the worst happens, the little girl will say: yes, but I 
decided to do this myself, and we have to confirm that the father was stipulating 
whether and how she should act. This means she acts as a tool for him. Then we can 
make a link in the chain and maybe say why they were both out and about, because 
the older one is the one pulling the strings, but that’s difficult to do." (AK15) 
This part of the interview addresses the fact that it is difficult to deal with offenders under the 
age of 14 who belong to family clans. The children quickly disappear from public institutions 
and return to their families. As described, the families themselves do not try to prevent the 
children from committing crimes; instead, they explicitly involve the children in these crimes. 
This problem is also described by other experts interviewed: 
“I would say, if we are talking about clans, that in this kind of clan solidarity, which 
they are usually born into, no one is making confessions or anything about this family 
group. (...) What has also confused us in the past is when we have underage offenders, 
a decision is made to take a 14-year-old to a children's home because they won’t 
arrest her. And then the next morning they’re surprised she’s not even there anymore. 
These are patterns of behaviour that we can predict, but we are also dealing with 
educational practices, and it’s frustrating when you know she was actually born into 
one of these clans and she is already a professional at the age of 14. But under our 
legal system, she has still just reached the age of criminal responsibility, and the dis-
trict attorney's office has a hard time taking minors into custody." (Police officer, 
GW04) 
The strong bond within the clan is also maintained by planning and arranging marriages in such 
a way that no one without a similar family background is brought in: 
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"But here you have cases where cousins are married with nephews and so on, they 
are not marrying out of love, these are arranged by the older members and these are 
families of a considerable size, it’s true. And they ultimately finance their good life by 
committing crimes. That’s true. You see this in proceedings from time to time, where 
an analyst really worked on it for a long time, and the result is a diagram with dozens 
of people on it, really dozens, sometimes in the triple digits, somehow all related to 
each other through marriage, affinity by marriage or something like that. These are 
the dimensions we are talking about." (Police officer, GW05) 
This practice creates not only an internal bond but also a large network of people. Among other 
things, this functions as a "supporter network" in which people help each other based on their 
shared family relationship. This is particularly relevant for organising accommodation, which 
makes it easier to commit crimes in different cities and countries: 
“So if you have a family, I'll give a simple example, who is living in Hannover and 
they want to travel to France and their family is so big that they just call Aunt XY in 
Paris and ask: Can I come by for three days? Then I would say this is the European 
way of thinking: ‘Oh, that’s a bit inconvenient for me, but we haven't seen each other 
for a long time, child, do stop by.’ Within these family structures the network is so 
strong that they are expecting people to join them, we’ll see 18 people living in one 
apartment, in a 40 square meter apartment, they are not concerned at all and they are 
only coming for two weeks to work here. They talk about it very proudly: “Did you 
eat well?” “Oh, I ate very well”. Of course they are talking about the stolen goods, 
and then they leave two weeks later and call their uncle, brother-in-law, whoever and 
say: “We're just passing through, can we take a trip to Vienna?” “Sure, that’s not a 
problem. Come visit”, so they stay on the move, and they have this basic structure, 
this network that has been created, and it’s so strong now, I think all they need to do 
is snap their fingers. We see this again and again when they are released from a tem-
porary arrest and the car is sitting in an exposed place or even held by us because it’s 
being examined, they are always on the move, they rarely or almost never call a taxi. 
“Someone will come in with a Serbian license plate number on it who just happens to 
be visiting.” (Police officer, AK15) 
In summary, the organisational form of the family clans is characterised by a close internal 
bond and isolation from the outside world. By socialising the children, who grow up in an 
environment where committing crimes is normal and who are involved in these crimes at an 
early age, as well as through marriages within the wide family relationships, there is an ex-
tremely stable organisation that follows a strict hierarchical structure with its own rules. 
3.1.3.5 Exploitative conditions 
A less frequently observed form of organisation is the establishment of exploitative conditions. 
This involves targeting people from abroad for recruitment, often with false promises, such as 
the possibility of taking up legal work in Germany. In Germany they are then provided with 
accommodation, and are expected to pay the costs by committing burglary. This process is also 
referred to as "rental pimping":  
“There is often a psychological element involved, for example this one case early on 
with the Romanians involving murder, in that case (...) came here with his family, he 
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was also a petty criminal. He was quite clever, he rented a house (...) of about 250 
square meters (...) and he had had contacts inside Romanian prisons, and there is one 
statement from Mr [witness in those proceedings] I believe or (P: Yes). Then there 
was another later on, (P: Oh) [name of the witness in the former trial] who clearly 
stated: yes, because there were different perpetrators involved and they had also re-
searched their previous convictions, they had previous convictions for murder, rape, 
burglary, gang theft and then committed the same crimes here. And he said quite 
clearly, [name of an offender], had these people, he knew these people from the prison 
in Romania and he called them in Romania and ordered them to come here and gave 
them a room in his house here, sublet it, and they had to give him 400 euros a month 
for the room, he was their rental pimp. And it was clear that they were committing 
burglaries, they get their money by committing burglaries. And it wasn't like he said: 
‘You have to go break in now', but it was quite clear that they were living here now 
and they had to make money, so they committed burglaries. And the perpetrators also 
drove everywhere, they committed the crimes and then gave him some of the stolen 
goods." (Prosecutor, GW03) 
As emphasized in this interview excerpt, a sense of psychological compulsion is established 
more than anything. The crimes of these “rental pimps" differ in terms of their method and 
execution. One characteristic element of this form of organisation is the creation of a predica-
ment where the perpetrators believe they have to pay off debts such as travel expenses or run-
ning costs. One practice observed in this context is the confiscation of passports: 
"There are certain arrangements, whether this is the case in [city in the east of Ger-
many] I have no idea, but there is this residence. There is someone who lives in [city 
in the east of Germany], who is, say, Chilean and has lived here for 20 years in the 
city. And Chilean burglars will be informed in some way, okay, if you come to [city in 
the east of Germany] and you need logistical support, then contact him, he has this 
phone number and that phone number. So they establish a business relationship of 
some kind, and it is not uncommon for him to say: "Okay, then give me your passports 
until you’ve paid for it.” That happens regardless of the motivation. (Police officer, 
GW05) 
There is often a dynamic of dependency in these cases because the perpetrators have no local 
knowledge and, above all, no language skills. The residents who provide them with accommo-
dation, which they are forced to pay for by committing crimes, also provide logistical support 
and assistance in everyday life.  
3.1.3.6 Mafia structures 
In some cases, mafia structures are also observed in the area of organised residential burglary. 
Members of those criminal structures that are based below the so called „thieves in law“ organ-
isation, which originated in the countries of the former Soviet Union, have been named several 
times. In particular, male Georgian perpetrators are connected with "thieves in law” in the area 
of residential burglary: 
"As I said, with the Georgians, we have information from other federal states that 
there are indeed some connections to organised crime, that is, those Russian thieves 
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in law, and there are some kind of criminal authorities in the background, some of 
whom also are responsible for the sale of stolen goods." (Police officer, AK09) 
Forms of organisations involving "thieves in law" are characterised by a strong hierarchy and 
professionally skilled members, who can be recognised by their individual tattoos. However, 
these groups also include others when committing crimes, some of whom are non-professional 
perpetrators: 
“The only real direct organisation we have seen are the Georgians, if you look at the 
Georgians, there are three perpetrators who are thieves in law, that’s how the Geor-
gians consider them anyhow, by their tattoos for instance, who are located here per-
manently. And they get asylum seekers every now and then who commit one or two 
crimes and then disappear. (...) They live here permanently and find perpetrators in 
the asylum camp. And you can see cars now constantly parked in front of the asylum 
camp that change their license plates 20 or 30 times and then drive through [state in 
eastern Germany], Germany and commit crimes and then come back again, go sleep 
in the asylum camp and then deliver the stolen goods to [city in eastern Germany]" 
(police officer, GW02) 
These findings once again illustrate the discrepancy between the executive and the planning 
level. Even in highly professional organisations, the executive level can be occupied by less 
experienced persons. It remains unresolved whether these perpetrators eventually become part 
of the organisation or will only be involved in committing a few crimes at short notice. 
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3.1.4 Preparing for crimes 
Exploring possible crime targets by moving around in residential areas is a typical predicate 
behaviour seen with organised residential burglaries. Usually the perpetrators walk around sin-
gle-family housing estates and ring the doorbells to check whether anyone is home. If the resi-
dents are at home, an excuse is made up for why they rang or sometimes the opportunity is used 
to enter the house and take a look at the living areas: 
“Those two with the black skirts, who went around asking for water and then entered 
various houses. That's another phenomenon." (Police officer, GW03) 
If no one is home, the perpetrators look more closely for possibilities ways of entering the 
residence. Windows and doors facing away from the road are preferred entry points. 
Apart from this rather spontaneous way of committing crime, however, crime targets are ob-
served over a longer period or scouted out in advance. The perpetrators move around the hous-
ing estates in question and look for suitable properties. However, they do not break in immedi-
ately; instead, they keep track of the properties first by photographing the properties with a 
mobile phone: 
"But some of them will actually take pictures. Nowadays everyone has a smartphone 
(...) And when they look at the houses, they look at what the windows look like, what 
the doors look like (...)" (Police officer, GW02) 
This scouting is also carried out by people who are relatively inconspicuous on public streets 
and also in smaller residential areas, such as young women or presumed couples: 
"When two older ladies, let’s say, come to the neighbourhood, it may be noticeable, 
but two young girls, 15, 16, 17, who are walking around like so many others with their 
smartphones in their hands and talking about well, just the emotional problems that 
always exist at that age. It's not conspicuous, nobody pays any attention. And when 
they walk around the neighbourhood, well, they can go anywhere. But an older woman 
or two older women, what are they doing here?" (Police officer, GW07) 
Preference is given to houses that offer easy access via gardens. In order to determine a suitable 
time for the crime, the method of ringing is used as described above to check whether residents 
are present. On the other hand, the perpetrators observe the crime targets beforehand and wait 
for the residents to leave the house or go to sleep: 
"And then you choose (...) the houses where there’s a field, where there’s a footpath 
or a transport route, and wait until the lights go out or until the inhabitants are away 
and then break down the patio door from behind, that’s actually the way they do it, 
and then carry away everything of value." (Police officer, AK16) 
However, the surveyed experts also described methods for determining longer absences, e.g. a 
holiday trip: 
"We had a group of perpetrators that moved the garden gnomes in the front yard to 
check if anyone is home or not. “If the garden gnome is put back in place, someone is 
there, and if not, then they are gone.” (Police officer, GW04) 
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Some perpetrator groups focus particularly on wealthy households. This can be indicated, for 
example, by high-priced cars or other external features of the house. In addition, however, in-
formation about valuables is also obtained through hints from people who have, or used to have, 
legal access to the house for various reasons:  
“In any given house there’s hired help, a cleaner, workmen, even care services, or 
even a lady who worked at some airline in some airport who knew exactly that so-
and-so was flying away and the apartment would be empty. And then they pass on the 
hints." (Police officer, GW10) 
This quotation clearly shows that, in addition to persons who know the potential victims through 
service relationships or similar dynamics, information is also given to perpetrators by people 
who obtain information about the victim for other reason, such as airline employees in this 
example. This means that people who have never had access to the house before can also be-
come potential tipsters. 
In addition, the properties are inspected to see whether there is security technology that could 
attract the attention of residents or neighbours. For instance, perpetrators look for motion de-
tectors or cameras in advance that can be deactivated or avoided when committing the crime.  
The time of the burglary depends mainly on the daily rhythm of the residents. Generally, crimes 
are committed around the afternoon and early evening hours when the residents tend to be 
working. In addition, burglaries occur at night, although to a lesser extent. This is attributed to 
organised groups due to the clustering of crimes: 
“In terms of clusters, sometimes we had three, four burglaries at night or during the 
day when people were at work, the homes had been scouted out and they knew no one 
would be there, it’s a small housing estate, maybe three, four, five homes were robbed 
on a single street." (Prosecutor, AK01) 
By wearing gloves and sometimes face masks, the perpetrators try not to leave any traces at the 
crime scene. Furthermore, care is also taken not to leave any "data traces". To this end, perpe-
trators try not to take mobile phones with them to avoid to leaving any relevant radio cell data 
behind. Alternatively to ordinary mobile phones, so-called "disposable" mobile phones are 
used, i.e. easily accessible prepaid cards that are changed frequently: 
“The tendency is not to use them during the immediate execution of the crime. Before 
and after, however, it would be possible to obtain knowledge, for instance if someone 
were to show up with his iPhone 7, always using the same number and then saying: 
“man, man, man, so and so”, instead they are arriving with several mobile phones, 
there are now phones that let you use multiple SIM cards, so I will use multiple SIM 
cards." (Prosecutor, AK08) 
These various telephone numbers are also difficult to trace, since they were usually acquired 
with fake personal data and therefore do not give any clues about the identity of the person who 
owns the number. In addition to mobile phones, radios such as walkie-talkies are sometimes 
used: 
"Well, as I said, the smart ones use walkie-talkies, and those can’t be accessed. Oth-
erwise they have work mobiles, since two people are usually in the property and one 
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is driving the car. That means they park, drop off, drop people off, then break in and 
then have to - so to speak - the one who is outside keeps watch in case anything hap-
pens, if the police comes or whatever, and then they are picked up again and either 
driven home or to the next crime scene. So the extended conversations on mobile 
phones, the way it used to be, that, unfortunately, is over." (Prosecutor, AK14) 
Some professionally acting burglars are also considering the possibility that the police are mon-
itoring telecommunications, so they refrain from talking about their crimes on the telephone. 
At the crime scene mobile phones are mainly used to organise the transport of the perpetrators 
to and from the scene and, in some cases, as means of communication to warn of potential 
dangers. 
In addition, the interpretation of false traces can make work even more difficult for investiga-
tors: 
"But he knows very well that it’s a problem if he takes his phone with him. They don’t 
do that, instead they use walkie-talkies or nothing at all, and so on and so forth. They 
just leave a few false traces, which we’ve seen before, picking up a few cigarette butts 
at the station and dropping them at the crime scene." (Police officer, AK05) 
The means of transport used to get to the housing estates are extremely diverse. In some cases, 
public transport is used, since foreign perpetrators using their own cars in a residential area, and 
therefore with foreign license plates, would quickly attract attention. Rental cars are also used, 
some of which are rented using false personal details. The use of rental cars also reduces the 
risk for offenders of using a car that the police have equipped with a transmitter or technology 
for monitoring vehicle interiors: 
“It’s safe to say that they are highly professional, they know very well that they 
shouldn’t take a mobile phone along. They rent cars, to prevent transmitters from 
being used in advance, they rent vehicles and they are actually particularly clever. 
“It’s very hard to catch them, even if you are certain they are committing burglaries.” 
(Prosecutor, GW03) 
In this context, both scouting out and the actual execution of the crime are carried out collabo-
ratively. Typically, two people enter the property while the driver moves away from the crime 
scene and then picks up the other perpetrators after the crime has been committed. When arriv-
ing by public transport, the perpetrators do not have the opportunity to leave the crime scene or 
the residential area quickly, but there is also no danger that potential witnesses could write 
down their license plate. 
3.1.5 Target properties and methods 
When choosing the target properties, the perpetrators concentrate particularly on free-standing 
single-family houses or villas with potential entry points that are difficult to see. Affluent sub-
urbs, particularly the housing developments on the outskirts of large cities, are a particular fo-
cus. These are mostly residential areas occupied by people with a higher standard of living. In 
particular, an area’s motorway connections can be a decisive factor for the perpetrator in se-
lecting a property to target. Especially housing estates along main traffic arteries allow the per-
petrators to get away very quickly: 
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"(...) the groups of perpetrators like to use, let’s say, the highway getaway routes, or 
to put it more simply, you can get back to where you came from quickly, and ultimately, 
in most cases or in many cases, it can be observed that crimes are committed not far 
from highway exits or access roads, simply because you can quickly disappear again 
before any approaching investigators arrive." (Police officer, GW07) 
Areas of Germany with a dense transport network in terms of infrastructure offer perpetrators 
the opportunity to reach multiple towns and cities quickly. Especially the border areas of Ger-
many, for example with Netherlands, France and Belgium to the west, as well as with Czech 
Republic and Poland to the east, offer a quick opportunity to escape German authorities. Some 
perpetrators or groups of perpetrators use this infrastructure to rob several houses within one 
night or within several days. Nevertheless, the selection of target properties is not limited to 
areas with well-developed infrastructure. Even in smaller towns in more rural areas, burgla-
riesare committed by organised groups of perpetrators. Some of the experts questioned suspect 
that this could be due in part to an insufficient police presence in these areas. 
Organised groups often select single-family houses as targets for burglary, and free-standing 
houses in particular involve a low risk of discovery. The interviewees believe that apartment 
buildings in inner-city areas are more likely to be targeted in drug-related crimes. Nevertheless, 
organised perpetrators are also active in large cities and also target multi-family houses. A clear 
demarcation cannot be made in this respect; on the contrary, there are regional differences 
throughout Germany. 
The actual crime, i.e. breaking into the property, is often not different when committed by or-
ganised perpetrators or by perpetrators without a high degree of organisation. This is mainly 
because it is relatively easy to break into a flat or a free-standing house. Usually simple tools 
are used, such as a screwdriver, to pry open the relevant windows or doors. Also, one stone is 
often sufficient to break through the window pane and enter a house. 
“So there's no need to attempt particularly skilled methods. Instead what happens is: 
‘Oh, there's a door open' or 'There's a house, I don't see any neighbours around, I’ll 
break a window, jump in there quickly, see if I can find a wallet or a watch, some 
jewellery or a laptop or a mobile and then I'm gone'. Here it’s more about quantity 
than quality, it's mass instead of class, clearly, even when you are dealing with organ-
ised crime." (Police officer, AK11) 
The simple methods employed when committing crimes are also emphasised by the Lithuanian 
police: 
P1: "As far as residential burglaries are concerned, these are mostly lower-level per-
petrators. You don't need any special information, knowledge, tools, or an experi-
enced, skilled thief who carries it out, breaks in and removes protection systems. Steal-
ing a new BMW is much more difficult and above all finding opportunities to do so, 
whereas with the residential burglaries it doesn’t take much, and with the Lithuanian 
organised criminals, they opt for the easiest point of access. For example, if they see 
a protected door and an unprotected door, they will choose the unprotected door and 
break in regardless of whether the flat is fancy or not." 
P2: “So, as always, there are exceptions, but usually they are not collecting tons of 
information about the owner, they are not scouting out. A place and time is chosen 
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where there is very little chance of anyone being at home and as soon as an obstacle 
comes up, they drop everything and flee." (Police officer, Lithuania) 
Due to the simplicity of prying open a window or a door and the low level of expertise required 
to ultimately get into a house, perpetrators usually apply the same methods every time. The 
surveyed experts from abroad report that they too observed perpetrators sticking to the same 
method: 
“It’s the same with residential burglaries. For example, if a person is able to break 
windows, he will specialise in this one method because that is his strength." (Police 
officer, Lithuania) 
The police in the Republic of Moldova also found this specialisation in a joint investigation 
with France targeting various groups of perpetrators: 
"So these groups also specialise when it comes to burglaries. For example, one group 
breaks in through the window. Another group might open the door using a properly 
chosen key. Another group might switch off the alarm system, for example. This occurs 
within these larger organisations. They have these larger criminal organisations, then 
there are these groups, each with a specialisation, a role. So the roles are distributed 
or divided and the way the burglaries are committed is a calling card for that one 
particular group. A group that breaks through the window, for example, will never 
turn off an alarm system." (Police officer, Moldova) 
In some cases, the perpetrators do not bring their own tools for the burglary, but instead use the 
equipment that they find directly at the house, in, for example, a garden shed. 
Nevertheless, there are groups of perpetrators, especially in the area of organised residential 
burglaries, who are characterised by a far more specialised approach. This includes, for exam-
ple, drilling out the window frame with a hand-operated or battery-powered drill to open the 
window lever. This method makes it possible, at least with a hand drill, to quietly enter a build-
ing, especially if the burglary occurs at night while the occupants are sleeping in the house: 
“In these cases, they are essentially drilling a hole in the patio door below or next to 
the lock area at night and then, doing this quietly at night, with a hand drill if people 
are sleeping below, and then a bent wire is fed through this hole to press the lock open 
and upwards, so far upwards that they can essentially open this door from the outside. 
And then they look for valuable goods in the hall area, there at least, but only on the 
ground floor." (Police officer, AK02) 
In addition to drilling, frame burning is another, though rarer method of getting into a residential 
building. This involves either heating the window frame or glass pane directly with a gas burner, 
making it possible to the lever on the window or the patio door, or it involves heating a metal 
rod to move the lever through the plastic frame of the window. 
Some perpetrators enter the building via the balcony using a ladder, which indicates an in-
creased degree of organisation and professional skill. Within the building, professional perpe-
trators are characterised by a structured approach. This can be seen in the way the drawers and 
cabinets in the flat are searched, whether doors were blocked to avoid detection, or whether a 
second potential escape route has been created. In rare cases, alarm systems are also sprayed 
with foam, which prevents the alarm from being triggered. 
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This highly specific method typically involves highly prepared perpetrators acting collabora-
tively. Above all, houses with a higher level of security are targeted by perpetrators with dif-
ferent specialisations: 
"Yes, and everyone has their own special job, I’d say, each of them has specialised a 
bit in their own area. For example, one of them knows exactly where on the patio door 
to apply the lever so the door will open." (Police officer, AK02) 
Experienced burglars are characterised by their fast and structured approach in the targeted 
property. The perpetrators know the usual hiding places for valuable goods and search for them 
in a targeted manner.  
The methods used by non-professional perpetrators when committing crimes are less structured 
and sophisticated than is the case for professional perpetrators. Drawers and cupboards are usu-
ally searched as quickly as possible and chaotically, which means that the apartment is often 
found in ransacked condition. This method is particularly common among perpetrators in the 
context of drug-related crime. In a very short time, the perpetrators try to obtain many valuables 
or cash which can be spent to purchase drugs. But even untrained perpetrators who are not 
associated with the drug milieu are characterised by a rather unprofessional approach. This is 
usually characterised by a rough entry, such as entering through the patio door or front door or 
breaking a windowpane with a heavy object. Nevertheless, these methods can only distinguish 
between experienced and inexperienced perpetrators to a limited extent: 
"Yes, well, the question of methods is very difficult. Many perpetrators simply decide 
what to do depending on the situation, and some methods are just very unspectacular, 
and if they are just prying open a window, for example, this method does not distin-
guish certain types of perpetrators from others. When it comes to the way the method 
is executed, that is the only way you can really observe whether you are dealing with 
an experienced perpetrator or not. So if you have a perpetrator and there are 19 to 
20 lever marks on a simple plastic window with a mushroom lock, then you know for 
sure someone’s still got a lot of practicing to do. And then you have a window where 
they know exactly that if they put weight on the right corner three times it will break 
open, and there are three lever marks, then you can tell it was someone with good 
tools who knew exactly what he was doing. Others are amateurs, bungling around on 
a window until they eventually break the glass in the next window instead. Some as-
sessment is possible in those cases." (Police officer, AK10) 
This makes it clear that it is far more difficult, especially in the area of residential burglaries, to 
draw conclusions about the perpetrators’ degree of organisation and professional skill based on 
their methods, and that the classifying of these crimes as organised crime would require more 
extensive clues than would be the case for other crimes. 
In connection with the perpetrators' procedures, it is also apparent that the perpetrators have so-
called anchor points in Germany. For example, contact with people living in Germany plays an 
important role here: 
 
 
40 
"And very often in these countries, foreign countries where the crimes are committed, 
the local Lithuanians who are organised in communities, for example, we say that in 
Germany, they really need help here, for example to find out when someone will leave 
the house or where you can hide things, these tactical aspects are covered that way.” 
(Police officer, Lithuania) 
The existing contacts help them to find their way in Germany and to better organise the crimes 
or to hide and sell the stolen goods. These do not necessarily have to be people from the same 
country of origin. As the Romanian police describe, some of the perpetrators stay in Germany 
for quite some time, building up their own required "infrastructure”: 
"We had a big case here with perpetrators from (X). This is a circle, it's like a circle, 
it's like a ring around Bucharest. The perpetrators were already specialised in this 
area and three years ago they moved to Germany en masse. All three of these individ-
uals registered secondary residences there and made contacts with Germans. They 
settled in and, let's say, had a normal life and then started identifying suitable burglary 
sites." (Police officer, Romania) 
The Moldovan police observed a similar pattern: 
"(...) on the other hand, they have friends and relatives in these countries, in European 
countries, and they get information about opportunities, so to speak." (Police officer, 
Republic of Moldova) 
3.1.6 Stolen goods and use of stolen goods 
Most of the stolen goods are limited to cash and jewellery. In some cases, however, the perpe-
trators also take technical devices such as expensive notebooks, tablets, mobile phones or pho-
tographic equipment with them. According to the experts' assessment, stolen goods of this kind 
have declined in recent years, which could be related to the possibility of tracking electronic 
devices.  
Professional perpetrators are usually able to recognise the authenticity and value of jewellery. 
Costume jewellery is typically sorted out at the crime scene and not taken with them. The per-
petrators can therefore be identified not only from their methods, but also based on which goods 
were stolen. Another characteristic of more professional perpetrators is breaking open or taking 
away safes.  
However, taking everyday objects can also be an indication of certain organised groups. For 
example, the theft of daily necessities is linked to burglaries committed by family clan struc-
tures: 
"Even in the stolen goods you could see that children's things and women's things 
were also taken, so it becomes clear, all right, there must be a connection somewhere, 
a family relationship or a female friend or something. And we were able to find out 
about the perpetrators' working hours later, through operative case analysis, the way 
they were acting, they probably don’t have work, that is, they don’t pursue work." 
(Police officer, AK17) 
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These goods include shoes, clothes, perfume or handbags, which can be an indication that the 
actual targeted goods, namely the jewellery and the cash, have been given to the clan, and that 
other items robbed on the side are kept for personal use or are taken to give to a partner. 
After the crime, the stolen goods are either used quickly or temporarily stored. For this purpose, 
some perpetrators have specific collection points where they deposit the stolen goods for a cer-
tain period of time. These depositories are either located near their temporary accommodation, 
for example in the form of simple, self-dug holes, or specific collection points are coordinated 
within a group where the stolen goods are stored until they are used. 
“For criminals from the Western Balkans, we discovered several who were collecting 
jewellery, there are collection points, for example we once had a multiple-family 
house where there was a collection point in the attic, a bag was hanging there and 
items were put in and this bag was then supposed to be taken back home. “That is, 
everyone knew where it was ultimately supposed to go.” (Police officer, AK10) 
This strategy is used in part to avoid being caught by the police with the stolen goods, while 
also waiting until some time has passed. However, it is rare for perpetrators to be caught shortly 
after the crime still carrying most of the stolen goods with them: 
"With these organised groups, we assume that some of them will temporarily store the 
stolen goods near the crime scene, wait for the police investigation, which can’t last 
very long, because new cases will come up and the police will withdraw, and then 
there is mailing, which [the name of a police officer] already mentioned. We have seen 
luggage taken abroad in Flix buses, but we don't know which groups we're dealing 
with. We rarely have professionals in the immediate vicinity of the crime scene who 
still have the jewellery with them. We've had two or three situations like this in the 
last few years." (Police officer, GW04) 
Most of the time, the captured jewellery is either handed over to accomplices immediately after 
the crime or quickly hidden in a secure depository, for example in rented apartments, and then 
picked up again later. Particularly with so-called family clans, investigators assume that the sale 
of stolen goods is planned in detail, and that there are secured depositories and fixed receivers 
who then take the stolen goods and sell them: 
"They don't have the goods with them anymore. This means that there is a storage 
location somewhere or there has already been a handover. And we are convinced that 
they have also regulated the sale of stolen goods within a clan. They're not going to 
just ask anyone here in [big city in northern Germany]: "Do you want this?', so there 
must be either a fixed person who sells the stolen goods and who is part of the clan, 
maybe he lives here or the stolen goods are handed over right away so we simply do 
not have evidence." (Police officer, GW04) 
The sale of stolen goods occurs in many different ways. In some cases, the stolen goods are 
sold locally, or collected and sent to family members in the home countries later on. The police 
in the Republic of Moldova are also aware of this: 
"I told you at the beginning that many Moldovans have emigrated and worked abroad. 
And they have, for the past few years we have seen that Moldovan citizens might send 
various things to Moldova in packages. There are packages. There are minibuses and 
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buses that usually go from Italy to Moldova and back. All over Europe. And they make 
sure of that. So you have this transfer and transport of different packages. And in these 
packages you can also find stolen goods. That would be one way. Another way would 
be with cars, for example. With vehicles. So they come to Moldova from different 
countries and bring a lot of stolen goods. And it is even possible that, for example, if 
a motorcycle is stolen, it will be dismantled or disassembled and the individual parts 
will be sent to Moldova with these packages. The person receives the package, gets 
the parts, reassembles it and then is riding a stolen motorcycle." (police officer, Mol-
dova) 
Domestically, there are several ways of using the stolen goods. For example, jewellery or mul-
timedia devices are resold online. With regard to jewellery, there are several selling options, 
especially in large cities, such as buying and selling shops, pawnshops and jewellers. These 
buyers do not necessarily have to be recruited as direct resellers of stolen goods: 
"This is not a particularly difficult crime, and the sale of gold jewellery does not pose 
a particular problem once you see that gold is purchased everywhere here." (Police 
officer, AK09) 
Gold jewellery in particular is either taken to pawnshops or immediately taken to a jeweller or 
goldsmith and melted down. This also means that tracing items by the embossing in the jewel-
lery is no longer possible:  
"People already know where to get rid of these things and, depending on the way they 
work, they may send them to buying and sell shops or kiosks for specific goods or even 
gold trading, for example, to a goldsmith who will melt it down. And those goldsmiths 
aren’t implicated as receivers of stolen goods, they just didn't check their origin suf-
ficiently." (Prosecutor, AK04) 
Selling jewellery within Germany offers the advantage of higher prices than in the perpetrator’s 
home country: 
"As far as the stolen goods are concerned, as was mentioned earlier, I personally am 
a bit sceptical about this due to a simple line of reasoning, but that is just my personal 
opinion. There are fewer cases where these stolen items are brought to Albania to be 
sold here, in my opinion. This is because they already know that the prices are much 
lower here in Albania than in other countries or that this stolen item will sell for less 
here than elsewhere. The phenomenon cannot be ruled out, of course, it does happen.” 
(Police officer, Albania) 
However, Albanian police officers observed that certain stolen goods, such as electronic de-
vices, sell very well within Albania: 
"In Albania, for example, gold or expensive watches do not sell so well here and the 
perpetrators know they will have difficulties selling them, so they do not bring those 
goods here. (...) And in recent years we have seen a development where mobile phones 
are the most common item sold, they are in demand after all, and they are brought 
here along with Smart TV sets that are brought here, I don’t know, from Switzerland 
or from any other country, or laptops, because there is demand for those items here." 
(Police officer, Albania) 
 43 
The situation is different for the police in Romania, who described that gold jewellery is sold 
in Romania: 
“We do know of perpetrators in Germany who sell the stolen goods in Germany via 
acquaintances they have there or to people they know to be involved in these kind of 
dealings. But most of it is brought to Romania and sold here. Gold jewellery, espe-
cially in these (...) pawnshops. Well, they're pretty common around here. And the sto-
len goods are either brought here personally by them, by the perpetrators themselves, 
even accomplices, or they are sent by travel companies. These tour operators, the bus 
companies, transport a lot of stolen goods. Money is often sent to Romania through 
money transfer services. Western Union or something like it. But this is happening 
less and less, because they discovered that we are able to observe these transfer op-
tions and can also request statements from the companies involved in the concrete 
case." (Police officer, Romania) 
Information about potential receivers of stolen goods within Germany spreads relatively easily 
among the perpetrators, assisted above all by extensive networks of acquaintances. Relevant 
examples here include gold buyers or jewellers who do not ask about the origin of the objects 
and do not takedown any personal details. However, occasionally there are also organised fixed 
receiver arrangements that are integrated into the network and also receive information about 
the origin of the goods.  
“In the case with the Georgians, there was a kiosk owner in the Ruhr area, it was 
actually true that we observed our perpetrators, we wanted to arrest the backer, and 
then on Sunday morning our perpetrators had to wait before delivering their stolen 
goods because four other people had come to deliver their stolen goods before them. 
And perpetrators from all over Germany were really coming to this kiosk operator, 
handing over the goods to him and then driving away again. And the kiosk owner 
himself, well we were only in charge of part of the case, but he would then sell some 
of the goods in his shop, but some of them would be resold under the table." (Police 
officer, AK12) 
Even though there are some fixed receiver structures, it is easy to sell the goods quickly in 
several shops and exchange them for money. The stolen money or money from the sale is then 
either used to finance their own livelihood or some of it is sent to their home country. Services 
such as MoneyGram or Western Union are used to send money abroad to the family or clan 
anonymously and without bureaucratic processes, as already mentioned in the interview excerpt 
above from Romania. However, normal accounts are also used to transfer the money abroad, 
which makes it considerably easier for investigators to trace the cash flow. 
For larger quantities of stolen jewellery, the jewellery can be dispatched in several ways: on the 
one hand, parcels of money or jewellery are sent by mail, primarily to family members, who 
redistribute the stolen goods within the family. Jewellery is also transported as cargo in buses 
across the border. In this case, the bus drivers are recruited or bribed to take and deliver the 
goods. Highly organised groups of perpetrators also hide large amounts of jewellery or money 
in other goods, for example in old refrigerators or washing machines that are transported abroad 
as scrap metal. However, it has also been observed that larger quantities are shipped in sea 
containers, meaning that the family is obviously no longer the intended recipient. In addition to 
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jewellery and money, items such as mobile phones, clothes or similar goods, since they are 
intended for personal use and are rather difficult to sell locally. 
3.1.7 The use of alias names and forged identity documents 
Some perpetrators of organised residential burglaries use a variety of different names: 
“The majority of these people are also operating under dozens of alias identities, and 
when they enter the countries in question from which the majority of the perpetrators 
come, it is easy for them to get new identity documents, both financially and in terms 
of the time involved, it does not pose a problem. And that won’t be noticed here. This 
will only be noticed if the data has been identified in a comparison with already ex-
isting data, then all of a sudden it is conspicuous: well, Mr. XY, the last time you were 
Mr. YX, that’s funny. And that way I can find it out.” (Police officer, AK08) 
Often, counterfeit documents or different documents with these names are used: 
"(...) we have this problem with the Georgians, we don’t know the guy’s actual name 
because he has five different alias identities and, of course, matching IDs. They don’t 
just go by different names, they actually have five different identity papers, so I’m 
unable to catch them." (Police officer, AK05) 
Other surveyed experts emphasize the difficulty of identifying the correct name given the large 
number of names used: 
“There were two Roma women. The one we saw in the trial had ten or twelve aliases, 
you practically didn’t know what her name actually was, [name of accused] or [name 
of accused], until finally a Croatian passport was found where we learned that her 
name was actually [name of accused] (...)." (Police officer, GW07) 
In some cases, different police information exists for one person under different names: 
"(...) for some women we arrest, we discover they have 35 alias identities, and then 
we resort to using their first recorded name from the POLAS database at Inpol, where 
they presented a completely different passport (...)." (Police officer, GW04) 
Besides, some people legally change their names in their home countries. In addition to taking 
on another name by marriage, in certain countries this can be done by simply applying for a 
name change: 
"(...) for example, the man takes the woman’s name when they marry or changes his 
name through an administrative process. It's not a very common problem though. 
However, the person remains identifiable for us via his or her personal identification 
number." (Police officer, Romania) 
Even if the Romanian police in the interview excerpt assert that name changes do not occur 
frequently, name changes (independently of marriage) are nevertheless easier to implement and 
more common practice there than in Germany. The Albanian police also describes the use of 
aliases and the practice of changing names: 
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"(...) these are often people who use many aliases. Here we also see the phenomenon 
of Albanians who have become criminals abroad and then changed their personal 
details here in Albania, i.e. first and last names." (Police officer, Albania) 
Taking on the names of other family members is also observed among the perpetrators in the 
Republic of Moldova. However, this does not present a problem for the investigations of the 
Moldovan police, since identification, as in Romania and Albania, is carried out using identity 
numbers: 
"Of course, there are cases where a perpetrator is now known to the public. And to 
avoid being recognised, he will take the name of his wife or mother. Otherwise it 
doesn’t matter, because everyone here in Moldova has a personal number, or how do 
you say it? That’s right, an identity number." (Police officer, Republic of Moldova) 
3.1.8 Behaviour towards the police 
Perpetrators involved in organised residential burglaries are not typically willing to cooperate 
and/or make statements to the police. In particular, perpetrators who belong to hierarchically 
structured forms of organisation avoid making statements to the police and in court proceed-
ings. This is mainly due to the social connections within these groups of perpetrators, which 
exert strong pressure and act as a "code of honour". In addition, mafia structures or comparable 
structures are concerned about acts of revenge against their own families. 
"(...) There is a very low willingness to testify, both on initial contact and later through 
the defence counsel, because they are experienced and often have very experienced 
and skilled defenders." (Police officer, AK04) 
As elaborated in this interview excerpt, legal representation also plays a decisive role with re-
gard to willingness to give evidence. Dealings with law enforcement authorities are often left 
to lawyers. For highly organised groups of perpetrators, such as family clans, it is remarkable 
how quickly lawyers come into contact with their clients after they have been arrested: 
P1: "(...) To give an idea of the situation, you catch one of them and in a matter of one 
or two hours you have a lawyer reporting to the authorities. You have no idea where 
he came from." 
P2: “We have even seen cases where they were transported to the police station (P1: 
Yes) and the lawyer was already there." (Police officer, AK15) 
Furthermore, in cases similar to those described in the interview excerpt, the assumption is that 
accomplices were close to the crime scene, observed the arrest and then informed a defence 
lawyer. Presumably, these lawyers are commissioned by the family clan or other group mem-
bers, and also represent other members of the gang legally. In the following interview excerpt 
these lawyers are also referred to as "scene defence lawyers": 
“Otherwise, sometimes the lawyer calls me before I even know about the case, which 
makes you wonder how he even knows about the arrest, as a rule they immediately 
hire defence attorneys, these are really so-called scene defenders who are informed 
by the relatives and engaged relatively quickly, and then they also contact the client 
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directly and probably tell them that they should make use of their right to silence" 
(Prosecutor, AK06) 
The rapid mobilisation of lawyers by members of the group underlines once again the strong 
network and the high degree of organisation of the perpetrators involved. In addition, the per-
petrators are well informed about their legal situation and, in particular, the expected penalty 
for burglary. In this context, the Lithuanian police affirm that the perpetrators are thoroughly 
informed: 
“But we know, and this is important to emphasize, that organised groups collect in-
formation. They collect information about the legal systems in the respective states. 
They collect information about the tools used by police and they also come to court to 
learn what evidence has been found in the past and what mistakes have been made so 
that they avoid them in the future." (Police officer, Lithuania) 
According to the surveyed experts, a prison term is accepted if necessary to protect the accom-
plices or the clan. Very few perpetrators make confessions that reveal the overall organisation 
of the parties involved. If this happens, the confessions are minimal in most cases, describing 
their personal contribution to the crime or they try to make clear to the officials and the court 
that it was a first offence and they were acting out of need and poverty: 
"At first with the police they tend to deny it, either they say nothing at all or they say: 
“I just wanted to work here”. Unless they happen to get caught coming out of the 
house, then they usually say: “Yeah okay, I was trying to steal something, but that was 
the very first time”. In my experience, I haven’t seen confessions that give away more 
information than what was immediately apparent to the perpetrator that the prosecu-
tion authorities already knew, and certainly nothing that would have accused un-
known third parties.” (Police officer, AK08) 
In most cases, more extensive confessions are only made during the information gathering pro-
cess if the prosecution offers the accused a reduction in punishment. Among other things, the 
extent of the burden of proof also plays a role: 
"It is of course very, very difficult to make any overarching statement, because it de-
pends particularly on the role of the person in the group, on whether they are actually 
a dominant member of the group. Then it depends significantly on how strict the bur-
den of proof is. What's his track record, and what does the defence attorney advise 
him to say?" (Police officer, AK04) 
Thus, willingness to give evidence also depends on the respective position of the perpetrator 
within the group of perpetrators. Even single perpetrators who are not acting within a group or 
extensive network have a tendency to confess if there is a possibility of reducing their punish-
ment. 
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3.2 Criminal prosecution in the field of organised residential burglary 
The following section addresses the practical methods of criminal prosecution in the field of 
organised residential burglary. The problems faced by German criminal prosecution within 
Germany as well as questions of willingness and experience with regard to international crim-
inal investigations are addressed first. Finally, the perspective of foreign law enforcement au-
thorities is presented. 
3.2.1 Problems faced by German law enforcement authorities 
Criminal investigations in the field of organised residential burglary involve special require-
ments. In this context, the surveyed experts were asked to identify the main problems or areas 
for improvement they observe when it comes to investigative practices. These include funda-
mental difficulties such as scarcity of resources and a shortage of personnel, as well as long 
waiting times for trace analysis, phenomena generally observed in the processing of burglary 
cases (see Wollinger et al., 2016). In addition, however, they also mention hurdles in investi-
gative work related to the specific context of organised residential burglary, which will be ex-
plained in more detail in the following section. 
3.2.1.1 Legal hurdles in the investigation process 
Typically, the experts surveyed mention legal restrictions due to the German Code of Criminal 
Procedure (StPO), which makes certain investigative measures impossible or more difficult. 
Many of those questioned would like increased powers of intervention, in particular to learn 
more about the organisations and backgrounds of the perpetrators, which is often necessary to 
know before thoroughly delving into the investigation. Specifically, the fact that residential 
burglary is not classified as a listed offence under § 100a stop (telecommunication surveillance), 
and the resulting lack of investigative powers, was brought up as a problem in many cases: 
“Residential burglary is unfortunately not yet a listed offence. This means that for 
certain measures such as telephone surveillance, of course, a gang needs to be in-
volved. So you have to find at least three people first. You can draw a lot of conclu-
sions based on experience, of course, but first you have to overcome the gang thresh-
old, so to speak. As far as I know, this is now being changed, so even normal residen-
tial burglaries will be classified as a listed offence, that threshold needs to be removed. 
Then the police need to be properly outfitted, in terms of personnel for instance, to be 
able to handle the case, otherwise there’s no point in even getting started." (Prosecu-
tor, AK14) 
The problem for civil servants in this context is identifying the organisational structure behind 
individual burglaries in order to justify measures such as telecommunications surveillance and 
to establish relevant gang-like behaviour in the perpetrators: 
“In terms of legal obstacles, we are currently working on the level of suspicion, I hope 
that the legislative procedure will be easier for us in the future. This is exactly what 
we have been talking about here. That it won’t always be necessary to give a reason 
why the perpetrators are suspected of committing the crime as a gang. What I want to 
prove, the existence of a gang exact situation I am trying to prove, this gang, or crimes 
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that  gang-like patterns, or serial crimes, I will only be able to find them using these 
measures. Sometimes the cat ends up biting its tail, I need to already know what I am 
trying to prove in order to convince everyone that I need to use this method in partic-
ular. And this is for a crime that has a high impact on the victim in question." (Police 
officer, AK08) 
In order to get the necessary measures approved by the competent court, proof is required that 
the crime was committed by a gang according to § 244a German Criminal Code (StGB). So it 
first needs to be established that the crime exhibits gang patterns, which does not actually con-
firm organised crime or related structures. This suspicion must first be substantiated by addi-
tional measures in the course of the investigation. It remains to be seen how the required justi-
fications will change as a result of the new legal situation. 
In addition, requests for traffic data pursuant to § 100g StPO and the limited data retention in 
this regard pose a problem for civil servants. The evaluation of radio cell data in particular 
makes it possible to trace the movement patterns of suspects, but this measure requires proof 
that a gang committed the crime, and the evaluation of radio cell data requires a considerable 
amount of time and personnel. The fundamental problem here, however, is the short storage 
periods offered by the respective providers for past telecommunications data: 
“Particularly for radio cells, we are talking about very short time limits. That means 
the data is gone a week after the crime. In other words, if I have to anticipate the 
judge’s so-called decision period, which I estimate as two days, then I have to make 
my request four days after the crime. That would require a file to be there. That is, I 
would need to have filed a motion, and that motion would need to have ended up in 
court. And if I can't manage that very quickly, it'll be hard, especially if I have other 
things to do." (Police officer, AK08) 
According to the investigators, this data is essential for the ongoing investigation in order to 
furnish evidence of an active gang or an organised structure behind it. Especially when dealing 
with organised crime, further connections are evident, but they can only be identified if the 
measures in question are approved by the public prosecutor's office.   
3.2.1.2 Organisation of work between the police and the public prosecutor's office 
With regard to cooperation between the police and the relevant public prosecutor's offices, fur-
ther problems were identified during investigations. One of the greatest difficulties identified 
by investigatorss is the lack of concrete contacts in the relevant public prosecutor's offices: 
"(...) and in practice there is actually a contact person who is identified in all public 
prosecutor's offices, the contact person for gang crimes. In practice, however, this 
does not work as well as planned. About 75 to 80 percent of all cases are handled by 
the normal ‘alphabet department’ prosecutors. Say you talk with the coordinator for 
gang crimes. I'm already assuming he will say, "Put that in the normal alphabet de-
partment and then I have to figure out which department head is involved, which let-
ters have been assigned.” (Police officer, AK05) 
According to the officials, most of the individual cases processed within the general crime de-
partments of the public prosecutor's offices (so-called alphabet public prosecutors) and are 
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rarely dealt with in pooled organised crime departments or public prosecutors' offices focusing 
on organised crime. Limited resources which, in comparison with public prosecutors who only 
deal with the field of organized crime, make it difficult to consult cases that fall outside a spe-
cific are of organised crime. These limitations are perceived as a major problem. This is partic-
ularly challenging due to the high mobility and cross-regional activity of perpetrators of organ-
ised burglaries. Another fundamental problem is that alphabet prosecutors place limited focus 
on specific fields of crime. Especially with regard to investigative criminal prosecution, police 
officers complain that more extensive investigations will rarely be initiated by alphabet prose-
cutors, especially if these would need to be carried out across multiple federal states. In addi-
tion, the fact that individual cases are scattered across various public prosecutor's offices based 
on regional competences is regarded as a fundamental issue that makes it considerably more 
difficult to trace organised crimes, since they are each treated as individual cases: 
"In the public prosecutor's office they must be learning a few things now, along the 
lines of ‘even with simple residential burglaries cases, there might be a lot of sub-
stance behind it’. It absolutely cannot be said that every residential burglary case 
involving gang crime is conducted in an organised crime department of the public 
prosecutor's office. Even the organised crime cases we deal with here are not all con-
ducted by an organised crime department in the public prosecutor's office. There is 
always so much shifting of resources, because even then it might be decided by the 
head of department who says: ‘Okay, this department head has time right now, it will 
be directed to the organised crime department’ and a week later or a week earlier it 
would have just ended up with the normal department head. Well, even that depends 
a little on the individual case." (Police officer, AK11) 
In the opinion of the investigators, adequate prosecution is also prevented by the focus chosen 
for the investigation and processing of the respective cases, as well as the division of responsi-
bility between the police and the judicial system. In this context, the public prosecutor's office 
particularly criticised the rapid closure of some investigations and proceedings where the police 
officers believe further investigations could have revealed more extensive organisational struc-
tures and related crimes. 
Furthermore, the investigators are confronted with the problem that the power to approve police 
measures (e.g. telecommunications surveillance, radio cell interrogation) depends on the re-
sponsible public prosecutor's office, which is further complicated by scattered processing of the 
cases among individual public prosecutors:  
"The prosecutor’s office will say: ‘Oh, God, there may be a gang after all.’ We wanted 
to continue pursuing it after [name of the investigation team] broke up, and it started 
off well until [name of a prosecutor] had to leave and the new chief prosecutor said: 
‘But I consider a gang to be three or more people’, and if you don't see three people 
on the day of the crime, there's no radio cell." (police officer, GW02) 
This once again illustrates the problem posed by the lack of a permanently responsible authority 
for police and judicial cooperation in the context of organised residential burglaries.  
Particularly with regard to organised crime across federal states in the context of residential 
burglaries, further problems arise when trying to bring together the allegedly interrelated acts 
within one authority and group them into an overall structural case: 
50 
"What probably should be mentioned with this type of gang case or organised crime 
case, which are typically structural cases, i.e. there is a structure of perpetrators with 
many individual crimes, is that the judicial system still finds it difficult to conduct 
structural proceedings, to conduct proceedings against groups of persons, because 
the countries, the states are not very willing from the state to collect individual inves-
tigation proceedings and then conduct together as collective proceedings. It takes an 
incredible amount of work, it takes a very, very long time and in the end often not 
much comes from it." (Police officer, AK11) 
Even if the police have already collected extensive information on the connection between 
cross-border burglary offences, there is still the risk that the respective offences within the in-
dividual federal states will nevertheless be dealt with individually by the public prosecutor's 
offices responsible. A decisive reason cited for this type of procedure is, on the one hand, the 
extreme amount of additional work viewed from the perspective of the judicial system and the 
burden associated with this. On the other hand, the assumption that the effort is not always 
reflected in the outcome or in the severity of penalties faced by the defendants. As a result, 
related offences may ultimately be dealt with individually and no further knowledge will be 
gained regarding organised structures in the area of residential burglaries. 
However, there are also forms of work organisation in police and judicial cooperation where 
there is a specific public prosecutor dealing with organised crime who is permanently respon-
sible for organised burglary proceedings. The police officers and public prosecutors inter-
viewed who have experience in this type of cooperation view this as a great benefit for joint 
investigative work: 
“This is really a big help to us in itself, if you have a fixed contact person, you know 
each other and you can really, it all goes relatively fast and you’re on the same wave-
length. That is very positive and shows that, first it was the police who started focusing 
on residential burglaries and now the judicial system has followed suit, and in this 
respect there is more interaction happening. So in that respect, if this is maintained, 
it is certainly a very positive, very positive development." (Police officer, AK09) 
3.2.1.3 Federalism 
One of the major problems relating to the prosecution of organised residential burglaries, across 
all interviews, is the official jurisdiction of the respective prosecution authorities in the federal 
state. In particular, the lack of communication or inflexible communication channels between 
the authorities, the lack of a uniform database across the federal states and time delays due to 
official procedures were criticised: 
"Federalism. The biggest problem is federalism. The competence of the police force 
that ends on the national border and also, within a given country, the competence of 
the police within a district who do not feel obligated to investigate matters like the one 
I just mentioned, where there are indications that they committed the deeds here, this 
is an area of jurisdiction and of course I would like to initiate proceedings against 
them here as well, but the police then says: ‘This is a different district, the case should 
go somewhere else, they live somewhere else, it was just an offshoot here’ and they 
no longer considers themselves responsible." (Prosecutor, AK13) 
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Police experts also see a need for better and more consistent cooperation and action between 
police departments: 
"And here I can see that each department is handling the cases in its own area of 
competence, developing its own concept and I have to say, this is total nonsense to 
me. So if I have a series of crimes across different areas of competence, it is crucial 
for me for investigators on both sides to meet somewhere in the middle, ideally they 
would share an office. Whether this would have to be on a daily basis we can set aside, 
but for me it is terrible that everyone in the individual offices over here continues to 
work as usual and tries to identify the perpetrator and develop their own concept. It 
would be much better to develop a concept together that would be apply for both areas 
of competence later, and the investigators would have to come together in one office, 
but I think the police are a bit too rigid in this regard. There are some sensitive spots 
between them, and clearly from the perspective of personnel resources, you can’t just 
say I will give you five of my people for an indefinite period of time, but I believe that, 
if residential burglary is so significant, even from a political standpoint, then I have 
to offer the personnel for it." (Police officer, AK03) 
The structural division of responsibilities across the federal states makes it difficult for investi-
gators to detect interrelationships and organisations, since some of the perpetrators, especially 
in the area of organised residential burglary, are active nationwide, so individual cases are ini-
tially dealt with independently.  
Even within the federal states, if organised residential burglary is suspected, the respective re-
sponsibilities must first be clarified, then separately collected data and individual cases must be 
brought together and processed by an authority. Different case processing methods between the 
competent police departments and different transaction processing systems also make cross-
border cooperation and tracing burglaries more difficult: 
"However, we sometimes have incompatible systems, so [state in the north of Ger-
many] has a different processing system than [state in the north of Germany], but 
[state in the north of Germany] has the same system as [state in the north of Germany]. 
We need all interfaces to use the software of the Federal Criminal Police Office, in-
dividual data importation, points of importation and interfaces, we need uniform data 
collection and we also need a common standard of evaluation and analysis so we are 
always talking about the same phenomenon and its characteristics nationwide." (Po-
lice officer, AK04) 
Especially in this context, experts called for a uniform nationwide database that would allow 
for exchange and comparison of case data. The main problems highlighted here are the lack of 
access to the data systems of other police authorities and the different data processing systems 
in different federal states. 
In addition, the processing of information associated with a case plays a major role. Since the 
authorities do not carry out uniform case processing nationwide and the relevant data, in the 
opinion of the officials, is not always sufficiently maintained in the systems, large information 
gaps arise that impede further processing and the detection of interrelationship: 
“Our problem is, well, even though there are nationwide databases where perpetrator 
personal data is entered even for the area of organised crime in residential burglaries. 
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The problem is that these databases are maintained differently, so to put it relatively 
simply, the hard data is entered, ultimately we receive that data, but the soft data, 
which is very crucial for us, control messages, about where someone is moving, what 
other people they are with, or if there are telephone numbers. At the moment I would 
say there are communication problems nationwide." (Police officer, GW07) 
The lack of concrete contacts within the authorities or the "long" communication channels that 
sometimes exist between the individual offices also contribute to delays in nationwide investi-
gations. Thus, it becomes more difficult to identify existing connections between organised 
residential burglaries and the structures behind them, and, ultimately, to identify these connec-
tions nationwide.  
3.2.1.4 Investigation and existence of organised crime in the field of residential burglaries 
In addition to the previously mentioned legal and official restrictions, there are difficulties 
above all when it comes to the evaluation of surveillance measures and the possibility of prov-
ing that these are not simply burglaries, but rather organised collaborative residential burglary. 
If measures get approved, the actual evaluation of these initiatives poses another problem. A 
radio cell query produces extensive data sets, especially in urban areas, which have to be as-
sessed in terms of relevance. This step alone requires a considerable number of working hours. 
If further telecommunications surveillance measures are carried out in this context, the first task 
is to identify the respective perpetrators and attribute the concrete crimes to them:  
"We can't always just take a quick look and then identify ‘Who was that again?', (...). 
You don’t have telecommunications surveillance, and even if you have the surveil-
lance sometimes it doesn’t produce results. Until you’ve gotten that far (...) if we don't 
have that, we won't get an idea of the internal structure at all." (Police officer, AK15) 
Furthermore, new types of communication services (such as so-called messenger services) offer 
perpetrators the possibility of evading surveillance by officials, since these cannot be traced by 
the authorities. As already described in the chapter about perpetration methods, some of the 
perpetrators do not use any means of communication when committing crimes, which prevents 
the investigators from drawing any conclusions about concrete interrelationships and structures. 
Proving that there is a highly organised group of perpetrators behind a series of residential 
burglaries is seen as one of the biggest difficulties in the area of residential burglary: 
"You know there is a gang at work, you know they are suspects for these specific 
crimes, but finding proof, and that’s what I have to demand as a public prosecutor, 
the investigation has to go that far, to prove A, B, C, E were involved in this crime and 
that crime and that crime and that crime. And that is the main work my colleagues 
have to do. And then it’s on the table and sometimes the result is that we can't really 
prove anything to anyone (P: Yes). That’s half a year's work, intensive work for noth-
ing. And we know, in the back room we know or we are even convinced it was them. 
(P: Yes) But we don’t manage to get proof." (Prosecutor, GW07) 
Above all, the internal exchange of members in perpetrator groups, as well as the fact that 
crimes or the involvement in a crime cannot always be matched to particular persons, prevents 
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the investigators from gaining concrete knowledge about the existing perpetrator structures. 
Also, it significantly inhibits the possibility of legally tracing an organised, coherent group: 
"Mostly the perpetrators are swapped around, but that's something you have to realise 
at some point, and this approach always leads to arguments and ultimately at the 
assessment stage where the head of the prosecutor's office for organised crime says: 
‘At the moment I don't see any indication of that’ or he will say from experience: ‘Yes, 
this must be a family, there are more people behind it, someone is probably the head 
and the leader’. That is always the greatest difficulty and it’s always there, I have 
noticed it with every proceeding so far." (Police officer, AK15) 
The insights gained regarding the organisational structure of a perpetrator group are not always 
sufficient to be able to identify or prove concrete organisation or any underlying structure: 
"These alliances of criminals, of burglars, they are sometimes like a fluid mass. As 
you just said, someone will come along, then someone will be gone, then they need a 
driver, whoops, he got arrested, then the next one comes along, and to trace all that, 
okay, which crime was he involved in, that’s one thing, and then to prepare for legal 
prosecution, that’s not so easy, because you’re moving from the gang level to the pro-
fessional level, but wait, he was only there twice, we want to get at the professional 
level." (Police officer, GW05) 
The offence area of residential burglary is characterised by low requirements of expertise, lo-
gistics and organisation on the part of the perpetrators. In this way, crimes can be well planned 
without the need for a truly strong organisational structure among the perpetrators.  
This insight also leads to the question of to what extent organised residential burglaries are also 
considered organised crime according to the German definition. In Germany, the concept of 
organised crime is defined more thoroughly in the guidelines for criminal proceedings and fine 
proceedings (RiStBV). The prerequisites for a designation as organised crime are linked to a 
number of special characteristics. Organised crime is “systematically committed crimes that are 
characterised by the pursuit of profit or power which, individually or in their entirety, are of 
considerable significance, if more than two parties cooperate for a longer or indefinite period 
a) by using commercial or business-like structures, b) by using force or other means suitable 
for intimidation or c) by influencing policymakers, the media, public administration, judicial 
systems or businesses. The term does not cover "crimes of terrorism" (Meyer-Goßner & 
Schmitt, 2017, p. 2396). The question is to what extent this directive also applies in practice. 
All interviews show that the phenomenon of gang and planned residential burglary does not 
necessarily meet the criteria for the definition of organised crime. From the perspective of most 
experts surveyed, burglaries are not organised crime in the classical sense. In addition to the 
lack of influence on policymakers and the economy, the significant number of loose offender 
groups also speaks against a classification as organised crime: 
"(...) Of course, different characteristics associated with the organised crime defini-
tion are not necessarily applicable for these structures, since many of them are loose 
structures, you can’t just graft on this organised crime pattern the way we typically 
would, no. It gets a little blurry then, because the perpetrator structures are simply 
different from what we used to know." (Police officer, GW02) 
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The focus on mafia structures which characterises the definition of organised crime in Germany 
makes it difficult to draw a comparison with the offence area of residential burglary. However, 
the problem of sub-characterisation does not necessarily cause conflicts in police and judicial 
practice: 
“First of all it doesn't matter to us, because we would also deal with gang crimes, and 
I would say very few proceedings are really organised crime proceedings, really very 
few. And whether a trial is an organised crime trial may not be established until the 
very end of our investigations or perhaps even at the negotiation stage whether it fits 
into the classic concept of organised crime, but that does not matter when we are 
taking on the case. Instead we say that we are looking at a criminal offence with sev-
eral perpetrators, which is already apparent, because three or four people were seen 
or we have a number of crimes that we automatically attribute to more than one per-
son, and we see clues where we can dig deeper in our operations, it doesn’t really 
matter whether in the end it turns out to be organised crime or not. We are not so 
attached to the term organised crime now, except that of course very few crimes fit 
under the classical term." (Police officer, GW10) 
The public prosecutor's office sees the matter in a similar light: 
"But if you just have a series of burglaries, I don't think you have to hand it over, when 
you have already investigated half of them. And the organised crime criteria are im-
portant for checking the box on the computer, but otherwise they are not important." 
(Prosecutor, AK07) 
One of the reasons why non-compliance with the organised crime criteria does not appear prob-
lematic in practice is that the Organised Crime Directive is intended to organise police and 
judicial workflows and structures and is not focused on a criminal offence or the like. In this 
respect, many public prosecutor's offices choose not to use the classic term of organised crime 
and instead, for example, direct all burglaries committed by gangs to the corresponding organ-
ised crime department or squad, or establish special departments focused on gangs. The inten-
tion here is to conduct investigations that group together crimes, thus enabling proceedings 
against groups of perpetrators instead of officials processing individual burglary crimes inde-
pendently: 
"And that’s why I wanted to make sure that we're using the same definition when we 
say organised crime. We probably are not, and this is a crucial point in the whole 
matter, that this generally accepted definition of ‘organised crime’ in the Federal Re-
public of Germany, which is also in Wikipedia, for example, or generally accepted, 
this definition is far too narrow in my view, precisely because our specialist depart-
ments would actually be able to handle these proceedings in their entirety. Now we're 
not just talking about burglary, it can also be something completely different, begging 
scams, those pieces of paper or whatever. No single official can process all that, it’s 
not possible. And in my opinion that’s not a problem, but we would have to change 
the definition a bit. But this has been a little problem for years now." (Police officer, 
AK15) 
In some offices, this has led to an adjustment where new regulations have been drawn up and 
there is no longer any explicit reference to the directive: 
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"And now we have softened the definition, so it also includes: responsible for gang 
offences, serial offences and offences that require special criminal procedural 
knowledge. Because we knew, or at some point came to the conclusion, that we could 
not force this into the concept of organised crime, but this other kind of organisation, 
these gang organisations, and serial crimes also need to be organised, even if they 
were committed by a single offender. So we reworded the definition of competence for 
the organised crime department to reintroduce these phenomena. We used to say that 
we, as members of the organised crime department, will not investigate that simply 
because it is a serial crime, it is not our kind of organised crime. But that then led to 
an uproar in the office, because then the heads of the general departments, as I always 
say, that is, department heads who investigate a variety of crimes: ‘You’re not doing 
anything in your department anymore, what else do you expect us to do? You also 
have to take on serious crimes'. And that was clarified in the office, and since then, 
the definition of responsibility has been pushed much further." (Prosecutor, GW02) 
The impetus for such adjustments was the realisation that, although the previous definition of 
organised crime is not suitable for organised burglaries, the organised crime departments are 
certainly capable of investigating such burglaries. Since the definition of organised crime only 
comes from a single directive, the offices have a certain freedom to act differently in practice. 
When organising work between the police and public prosecutor's office, therefore, there are 
not necessarily any problems, but the numbers given in evaluations and statistics dealing with 
organised crime in residential burglaries are not a very meaningful reflection of the severity of 
the crimes: 
"The definition is sufficient for assigning task to the police or the judicial system. For 
criminologists, the definition is not enough. They have quite a different perspective. 
But we are just looking for black and white, we need to put in this category or the 
other categories. And it’s enough for defining the categories. So here we can manage 
with the definition, with regard to modern area of crime as well, which we can still 
handle quite well. But as I said, if I were a criminologist concerned with the severity 
of the crime, which cannot reasonably be differentiated using this definition of organ-
ised crime, that doesn’t work. But for our purposes, whether we classify it as organ-
ised crime or not, the current definition is enough." (Police officer, AK11) 
It seems useful for organised crime departments to initiate investigations in the area of residen-
tial burglary even without being able to use the label of organised crime, simply because the 
structures behind a crime tend to only become apparent in the course of the proceedings: 
"Well, I'm not slavishly attached to this definition of organised crime when taking on 
a case, especially since we don't know where we will end up. Once we have completed 
the proceedings, then we look to see if it fits the pattern and if the circumstances 
match. That's how it usually works in practice.” (Police officer, AK05) 
However, adapting to the definition of organised crime is also seen as quite problematic: 
"Another problem is that we are still working with this definition of organised crime 
from 25 years ago, where we-, well, as the head of the organised crime department, I 
am also thinking about what is considered organised crime, it is organised crime or 
not, when it comes to situation mapping, it’s quite ordinary, we work through the 
indicators and then there are also proceedings carried out where a Central European 
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would typically say: that is organised crime, but we say it isn’t, we turn down the case, 
it doesn’t fit the national situation so it won’t be assigned a number. And that is an 
exciting development at the moment, which is also happening in politics, where people 
are saying that mass crimes can also be organised crime and we need to focus on this 
matter concretely with investigations, but on the other side we need to ask the ques-
tion: do we need to proceed from the definition of organised crime in preliminary 
investigations too, these are all considerations that were already on the table, to free 
us from this strict definition of organised crime, because that inhibits us rather than 
moving us forward in our daily work.“ (Police officer, AK05) 
In many burglary cases, an organised structure is recognised and the investigations are struc-
tured similarly to those dealing with organised crime. With regard to the characteristic situation 
of the Federal Criminal Police Office, however, narrow criteria are applied, so a low number of 
cases are depicted. Some of the experts questioned are afraid that these organised burglaries are 
not being taken seriously by the public and policymakers as a result, which could impact deci-
sions regarding the allocation of resources. 
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3.2.2 International investigations by German law enforcement authorities 
As results of previous research show, both the extent of residential burglaries and the causes 
and characteristics of the perpetrators vary regionally in Germany (Bartsch, Wollinger, 
Dreißigacker, Baier & Pfeiffer, 2013; Dreißigacker et al., 2015). The present investigation also 
showed that the crime of burglary is perceived very differently by the local police. In some 
regions, local perpetrators are mainly identified in the area of residential burglary and no con-
nections to other, foreign countries are seen: 
"This is also the case with us: for the cases that have been closed in recent years, we 
did not have any international references either, which might then have actually been 
regulated by Europol or other bodies.” (Police officer, AK04) 
In addition to the current findings on foreign perpetrators, in some cases the crime of burglary 
is considered to lack a higher degree of organisation on the part of the perpetrators, so that an 
extensive investigation or international investigation does not seem appropriate: 
"Something as selective as residential burglary, I mean, it happens, residential bur-
glary, but it’s also a question of the structures, I mean, there are groups of offenders 
who work here, but now I don't see any way of investigating on a supra-regional or 
transnational level. I mean, residential burglaries happen, but as a rule they’re not 
tightly organised from abroad, instead there are groups from abroad who are active, 
but they then also act here in this region and where do the stolen goods end up? (...) 
So I think Europol may be a little too high level for burglary, because when investi-
gating residential burglary you usually stay on the surface, you don’t typically get 
very deep. (...) I don't think you have to coordinate that from abroad, if you have 
maybe one or two runners who commit crimes here, but maybe that’s more in the area 
of robbery, organised robberies, where you get six-figure loot, then maybe it's more 
about organisation from abroad, in Lithuania, Russia or somewhere." (Prosecutor, 
GW03) 
The perspective given above, namely that burglary is not committed by gangs proceeding sys-
tematically with a high degree of organisation and connections abroad, is rarely represented by 
the criminal investigation authorities. Most expert interviews made a different assessment of 
the circumstances. Another reason why the phenomenon of a burglary is not discussed in an 
international context, however, is the lack of more intensive investigation efforts: 
“Especially to create the investigative approaches to say that this particular gang is 
organised crime, or that you really see the cross-regional aspect, this only works if 
you are evaluating these factors. (P: Yes) The individual crime per se is unspectacular 
from our point of view. (P: Yes) You have the factual circumstances, someone broke 
in, investment card, trace investigation record, observation of the scene, done. APB, 
process the traces, done. But the whole surrounding context, taking what’s there and 
connecting it together and drawing conclusions from it, that is the exciting part, you 
want to get to there, and then later to create these gang structures precisely, but often, 
and this is simply the reality, you don't get this far in the case for various reasons. 
And when the administrative part of such a case is so extensive, taking the adminis-
trative jumble and managing all that, statistically, processing it in some system, this 
alone takes up personnel resources. And it's not just us, it's the same for the public 
prosecutor’s office." (Police officer, GW02) 
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This interview excerpt emphasizes that typically, it is not the crime itself or the trace situation 
at the scene that bring about an international investigation, but rather the combination of mul-
tiple cases, the detection of a series and a gang structure behind it. However, this requires in-
tensive investigations, involving a large number of personnel, both for the police and the public 
prosecutor's office. If these factors are absent, an international connection among the perpetra-
tors is not necessarily discernible. Most of the experts surveyed, however, do observe burglars 
from other countries that are active locally:  
“I would go out on a limb and say, or to put it even more diplomatically, I can’t 
remember any residential burglary, organised crime proceedings where a German 
group of perpetrators was behind it. Now I know, I don't remember. And that means, 
usually, this is a cross-border case." (Police officer, GW05) 
It is true that local burglars are also identified, especially in the area of drug-related crime. As 
described here, however, in the context of professionally acting gangs in some regions the per-
petrators come almost exclusively from abroad.  
3.2.2.1 Willingness to conduct international investigations 
Nevertheless, the detection of international connections does not necessarily lead to interna-
tional cooperation with investigative authorities abroad. One reason for this is that the effort 
involved in international investigations does not seem justified or is simply too great: 
"(...) and how many of the 11,500 crimes remain (...), but perhaps generating such a 
volume of work through international cooperation cannot be typical. We still have too 
much on the other side." (Police officer, GW05) 
In some cases, an enquiry, especially with Eastern European countries, is ruled out from the 
outset: 
"And there are some countries, I mean quite honestly, to send a request for legal as-
sistance to Albania (P: send) I mean, really.” (Prosecutor, AK17) 
One reason for this is that such an approach seems hopeless, since it is not assumed that the 
local authorities are willing to cooperate. In this context, it is often supposed that the countries 
of origin for the perpetrators themselves have no interest in investigations, since the crimes do 
not take place in their own country and the damage would not affect them directly, but rather 
predominantly Western European countries: 
"So if they have a perpetrator who does not commit any crimes there, it would be 
difficult anyway to start an investigation in their home country and they don’t do an-
ything that would affect their countries of origin in any way. So in the end they don’t 
need to do anything about it. Essentially these matters are often based on pure good 
will.” (Police officer, AK05) 
This assessment is not necessarily based on the experience of not receiving responses from 
Eastern European countries. Instead, this is an assumption and there is no attempt at making 
contact as a result. Another reason for this negative attitude, especially towards Eastern Euro-
pean countries, is a lack of trust and the fear of working with corrupt state authorities: 
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"We have the feeling that you can't work together with them, they have all been bribed, 
particularly when it comes to scams where people pose as long-lost relatives, we have 
seen statements that the public prosecutor's office and state police have also been 
bribed. Extraditions that suddenly don't happen because money was thrown in. So the 
experience is sobering." (Prosecutor, AK03) 
In particular, the experts describe the risk that a request for cooperation could not only remain 
unanswered, but that this disclosure of information could hinder the ongoing investigation: 
“Prosecutor: I don't know, it's hard to tell whether corrupt elements are involved. In 
the East, you always have to be very, very careful. If you go further than Poland, we 
(laughs) hardly ever even make requests for legal assistance to Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, that is very difficult. If you have relationships or personal relationships with 
them, then something can be done. But official channels are always such a deterrent, 
because the hard facts we have, should we share them with the authorities, can we 
even justify that? 
Police officer: At worst, we’re exposing the case." (Prosecutor and police officer, 
GW07) 
The concern is that the suspects could either be warned by members of the police departments 
themselves, such as police officers, secretaries or interpreters, or that knowledge of the German 
investigations targeting certain individuals could be resold as a kind of "hint". 
In contrast, however, many investigating authorities have an open attitude towards joint inter-
national investigations or attempts to exchange information. In this context, the need for inter-
national exchange at the police level among internationally active perpetrators is emphasized 
in particular: 
"And at the end of the day, you get information that would allow us to potentially work 
together, and the goal must ultimately be to be active in a country of origin, where 
our perpetrators from Romania, Serbia or wherever they come from, are ultimately 
located.” (Police officer, GW07) 
Willingness to contact other countries is usually based on experience gained in the past through 
investigators' attempts at making contact. Contrary to the widespread assumption that Eastern 
European countries, in particular, are seldom willing to cooperate due to a lack of interest, the 
investigators' reports give a positive picture: 
"Surprisingly, the countries where one would expect the process to be sluggish or 
difficult often are excellent at establishing contact and they do so thoroughly, it is very 
informative. Looking towards Albania and Balkans, there are certainly countries 
where this works very well. I am now referring to the beginnings with Albania, where 
excellent cooperation is now developing, although with France, where people think 
this should work because it is a neighbouring country, they are sometimes reticent.” 
(Police officer, GW07) 
Many other interviews also mentioned that contacts with Eastern European countries or the 
countries of origin of the targeted perpetrators often work better than with the direct neighbours 
of Germany or other Western European countries: 
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“It is more or less successful, at the moment as [name of a police officer] said, we are 
trying to do a lot officially through the Federal Criminal Police Office. This all runs 
through Interpol. From the countries of origin you actually get information relatively 
quickly, and it is solid.” (Police officer, AK09) 
Above all, the assumption is that integration into the European Union leads to a high willingness 
to cooperate. Some of these so-called "countries of origin" are countries that have only recently 
joined the EU, and in this context their countries have undergone comprehensive reforms for 
some time now. Otherwise there are countries that are EU accession candidates or are working 
towards this goal.  
Negative experiences are reported more in relation to other Western European countries:   
Police officer: "Four hours have just gone by, (Prosecutor: Yes) and what we just 
talked through in four hours would not be feasible with France in four years (everyone 
laughs)." 
Prosecutor: "Yes, maybe it would work with France, but only through personal 
contacts I think (...)." (Police officer and prosecutor, GW03) 
Even though some of these cases may involve relatively little experience or personal experi-
ences, this can have a strong influence on future deliberations relating to international cooper-
ation. Nevertheless, some of the findings regarding the willingness of Western European coun-
tries to cooperate are ambivalent, insofar as some investigative teams report very good cooper-
ation and others have experienced very negative situations with regard to the same country. For 
example, the following interview excerpt describes good cooperation only with Scandinavian 
countries: 
“It's problematic in other European countries like France, Italy, England and so on, 
that's sometimes quite tough, Holland as well (P1: Holland extremely so, yes), yes. So 
the only ones that actually work reasonably well are the Scandinavians (...)." (Police 
officer, AK09) 
Other police officers, however, report very good experiences, particularly in relation to the 
Netherlands. This indicates that the success of international cooperation depends not only on 
the institutional framework but also on the specific people responsible for it. There seem to be 
great differences from case to case. However, this may also depend on the extent to which 
personal contacts already exist in Western European countries, which facilitate cooperation, 
while investigators without such contacts sometimes fail to find satisfactory solutions through 
formal channels. 
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3.2.2.2 Access to international investigations 
There are many ways in which international cooperation between investigating authorities can 
be established. In addition to formal legal tools and institutions, informal contacts are extremely 
relevant. 
3.2.2.2.1 Liaison officers 
So-called liaison officers of the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) are important contacts 
for establishing contact with foreign investigative authorities. As described above, they work 
locally and know the structures and working methods as well as key individuals in the respec-
tive country: 
“(...) because, as I said, there is also this liaison officer system in principle with the 
Federal Criminal Police Office, and just through these personal contacts of the liaison 
officers in the individual countries, because it’s always possible that if you manage 
something via the Federal Criminal Police Officer or via legal assistance channels, 
then the Federal Criminal Police Office’s liaison officer in the respective country 
might make more enquiries, and that’s what they are there for, they generally know 
the decision-makers and the right people to talk to there specifically. I think one ad-
vantage for the police in these cases is also these networks in these countries." (Police 
officer, GW06) 
In addition to the knowledge of country-specific particularities, the personal network of liaison 
officers is very beneficial for the work of German civil servants. The crucial factor here is not 
only arranging relevant contacts in order to obtain information or carry out joint investigations, 
but also the acceleration of formal procedures such as requests for mutual legal assistance. 
For German civil servants, the shared language and legal background as well as the understand-
ing of German procedures in investigative proceedings make it easy to make contact with a 
liaison officer. The experts interviewed view the Federal Criminal Police Office’s liaison offic-
ers as very committed and well-connected; the officials are often pleasantly surprised at how 
quickly their request is dealt with and how quickly they receive an answer, as can be seen in 
the following interview excerpt: 
"We contacted the Romanian liaison officer at the embassy in [city in the west of 
Germany] through a woman we had known for a long time, and asked if she could 
name a reliable service in this field so we could collaborate with them later on these 
technical questions. And yesterday, I couldn't believe it went so fast, this woman calls 
and say: "Listen, I've spoken to Romania and they are very interested in investigating 
this group of perpetrators with you.” (Police officer, AK05) 
Positive experiences are also discussed with reference to cross-border police teams, such as 
those that exist with Germany’s neighbouring countries. However, this is mainly about the ex-
change of information. 
 
62 
3.2.2.2.2 Mutual Legal Assistance and European Investigation Order 
However, if information is to be included in the investigation proceedings in order to be used 
in court, recourse must be made to the police or judicial legal assistance. Compared to personal 
contacts, these requests for mutual assistance involve bureaucratic effort, which is usually de-
scribed as very time-consuming: 
"Well, it's the public prosecutor's office, so the public prosecutor's office sends this to 
the judicial authority. The judicial authority sends it to the Federal Ministry of Justice, 
the Ministry of Justice sends it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the embassy there 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then somehow it gets in motion. Everyone has 
to take a look, then it all has to be translated, and they have to check if it all needs to 
be redone, and then finally someone comes, sits down and edits the whole thing and 
then it goes through the whole process including translation, then a response and a 
review if everything is okay, and so on and so on and so on. So just this filing process, 
where everyone has to take a look at everything, they have to check their box, you can 
assume it will take several weeks to months before anyone does anything substantial 
about it." (Police officer, AK09) 
A central problem with regard to requests for judicial assistance is the large number of different 
authorities involved. For example, one public prosecutor reports that contact with other Euro-
pean countries usually occurs via mutual legal assistance, but that the proceedings often take a 
very long time: 
“This channel is often complicated, so there are the Directives for International Co-
operation in Criminal Matters (RiVASt) and the RiVASt country section, there it is 
written how we are allowed to contact other authorities, and if it goes through this 
judicial channel, that is, through the Ministry of Justice of Germany and then the 
Ministry of Justice of the other country and then it goes so trickling very slowly down, 
and everyone thinks: oh, legal assistance is stupid, I don't really know how it works, 
and then they leave it lying around for the time being and it’s lying there in five de-
partments for a while, it takes half a year before you get an answer, because the an-
swer, the enquiry has to go through all those levels and it takes just as long coming 
back.“ (Prosecutor, AK07)  
In addition to the length of time required, a request for mutual assistance often involves a great 
deal of bureaucracy, especially with regard to legal requirements and wording: 
"I can only confirm what they said, as a department head you are reluctant to seek 
legal assistance. We have a Legal Assistance Department with us, but we formulate 
the request for legal assistance in advance, then the Legal Assistance Department 
looks again to see if everything has been correctly stated in terms of the international 
regulations and whether it has been formulated correctly, we really don’t like to do 
this. To start with, you can't use any abbreviations, it has to be written very formally, 
which is quite difficult, and then of course it depends mainly on the country. Legal 
assistance with Holland works excellently. Very quickly. We do a great deal, for ex-
ample, in the context of drug-related crime. I must say that I have dealt very little with 
legal assistance in the area of residential burglary so far, and I don’t like to deal with 
this, because it can take years depending on the country. What good is information if 
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you have people in custody, you have certain deadlines and four years later you get 
the information you need." (Prosecutor, AK15) 
To respond to the difficulties relating to mutual legal assistance described above, the European 
Investigation Order was developed and has been in force since June 2017 (see Section 2.8). 
Only a few expert interviews took place after the order entered into force, which is why the 
European Investigation Order was not addressed in every interview. In this respect, there has 
not yet been extensive experience with this legal instrument. However, one of the public pros-
ecutors questioned has already become somewhat familiar with it:  
"Now there's something new, a so-called European request for an investigation.  
(...) I personally haven't done it yet. It’s a form, I only looked over it once. Of course, 
it’s supposed to cover any conceivable case. Although this is actually theoretically not 
possible. And we found it quite difficult to fill out." (Prosecutor, AK15) 
It will only become apparent in the future to what extent the option of the European Investiga-
tion Order will overcome the previous difficulties associated with judicial assistance. 
3.2.2.2.3 Europol 
Europol's work is seen as particularly positive in terms of the various ways in which it can 
support investigative work. First, financial resources are important for organising conferences, 
making spaces available and also for enabling technical equipment: 
"What Europol is doing in this case, they have already done in other areas, they or-
ganise meetings and make funds available, Europol helps us for example within the 
framework of this Empact project that they have. We currently have transmitters that 
we use for this, GPS transmitters for installing in vehicles. I got them through this 
Empact project, because these transmitters are expensive, one transmitter will cost 
7,000-8,000 euros, sometimes you lose them, if the battery is empty, you can’t find 
them anymore (...) So Europol helps us the most by bringing resources together, by 
financing money and also maybe sometimes they conduct an evaluation project, which 
[Europol employee] is currently doing for example or something like that. If you are 
dealing with certain nationalities together, whether Serbs, Romanians, or whatever, 
you can look there to know if we are investigating the same clan throughout Europe 
and how can I bring investigators together there, what can be done there to handle 
the situation. Of course the next step is still missing, how do I manage this judicially, 
what is the procedure there. But well, that’s not Europol’s job, that’s not their con-
cern, that has to be done with police or (X) judicial channels, you have to do it some 
other way of course. That's the upside." (Police officer, GW03) 
In addition to financial resources, the excerpt of the discussion presented addresses the question 
of a European perspective. Europol provides an overview of trends for certain crime phenomena 
within Europe and thereby expands on the "national focus" of investigators:  
"(...) Europol's activities have been very positive over the last five years, they are, they 
do not exist very long, but for approximately the last five years they have been trying 
to bring people to the table and look at every new phenomenon, every new topic, 
sometimes from a European perspective. They have spaces, they have moderation op-
tions and personnel, and if there is an interesting new phenomenon, they contact the 
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countries, and we are practically next door to Holland we can drive to the Hague in 
our bus, of course there are many opportunities to travel somewhere. So we’re taking 
advantage of this opportunity already." (Police officer, AK11) 
Europol thus has the function of providing situation reports and analyses for the European sit-
uation. Europol is also expected to be a liaison entity, to bring countries into contact and bring 
them quite literally around the same table. They are highly appreciated as a “mediator": 
"(...) a group of offenders in the area of residential burglary who are involved in or-
ganised crime or a gang and they have connections to lets say Holland, France or 
Denmark, it means a lot that we can call Holland or France or Denmark, that we can 
call our colleagues in Europol and say: ‘Can you go on the other side to our colleague 
from Denmark or to our colleague from Sweden and give him a bit of a nudge. We 
have a group here, and these individuals are involved.’ And then I know for sure that 
one hour later my Swedish colleague receives the message, and a day later it is in 
Gothenburg with my Swedish colleague, and at some point the telephone rings and 
my colleague from Gothenburg calls and says: ‘Europol and my colleague passed this 
on to me’, this mediation, these arrangements are the best thing Europol is doing at 
the moment. Plus the willingness when we see that suddenly there are four countries 
involved, all of them dealing with the same issue, that I can call Europol and say: 
‘Why don't we meet at your office?’ And then they say ‘Okay, I have a room here, I 
have a room and a coffee machine, just come by that day’. And then everyone comes 
in, you sit down and ponder the future. And I think that’s really valuable, aside from 
all the great agreements and any great databases, its role as a mediator, this dating 
service (...)" (Police officer, AK11) 
This also illustrates that Europol offers communication outside of bureaucratic channels that 
can sometimes set specific proceedings in motion. However, different expectations of Europol 
were also expressed, as well as disappointment that Europol itself does not initiate or influence 
any police action: 
“As for Europol, well, it's good this is anonymous. Europol is an octopus without any 
influence on police action. They're completely irrelevant. (...) The best example are 
cargo thieves, Europol should actually intervene. 300 million euros of damages esti-
mated per year in Germany. Well, I would assume half a billion a year. Well, even 
when they cut open the cargo covering, that costs money. That's not included in the 
damage. Then Europol should say: ‘Sure, the perpetrators come from Poland, they 
are active in France, in Spain, but also in Germany, everywhere, well, we'll do some-
thing about it.’ They're launching a project because 40 mobile phones were stolen at 
a rock concert in Sweden. In that case the perpetrators come from Romania, they 
travel in, steal 40 mobile phones and then they are gone again. That’s being turned 
into a project. I don't know who works there, who sets the priorities. We also inform 
Europol, which so far, like Interpol, is a completely toothless tiger." (Police officer, 
AK16) 
An important and popular service offered by Europol is the SIENA communication channel 
(see Section 2.2). SIENA offers above all the possibility of simple and secure communication: 
"There was a delegation from Germany that was in Albania in January, where we 
described the situation and then discussed options together and the Albanians agreed 
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and said: “Look, for a limited period of time we are forming a task force here dedi-
cated to this topic and all requests you make to Albania should be addressed to the 
task force directly via SIENA”. And that ultimately means that there are now people 
sitting on the other side whom I have spoken to myself, and as the official in charge, 
and as official in charge can say: “Oh, I'll write them now” and if everything goes 
well, I'll actually get an answer within two days with some real information. In cases 
like that, when employees and colleagues have doubts or concerns, then they will be 
convinced and it will work out just fine." (Police officer, GW05) 
The expert interviews emphasize that communication through SIENA has above all become 
faster: 
"(...) The response time is completely, completely different when you look at the chan-
nel he was just describing. So we're talking about one, two, three days instead of two, 
three, four weeks. And I remember, this is not coming from me, my uncle is a senior 
public prosecutor, (laughs) and he always tells me that if he doesn't want to see some-
thing again, he sends a request for legal assistance to Italy, so (both laugh) as I said 
that's not coming from me, but there are these new developments as an acknowledge-
ment that perpetrators don't stop at borders, they are doing great work to speed things 
up. Well, I'm expecting a lot from that.” (Police officer, GW05) 
Availability and access to SIENA has been continuously expanded in recent years. This has led 
to a simplification and acceleration of work processes: 
"And with SIENA the big problem in the past was that first I have to be convinced it 
will do any good, then I have to fill out a formal questionnaire, preferably in English, 
then I have the language barrier, because for [city in the east of Germany] that was 
the case, then I have to pass on the proceedings to the State Criminal Police Office 
who are responsible for international cooperation, they have to do an initial quality 
control, then the case goes to the Federal Criminal Police Office, and the Criminal 
Police Office as the national central office in Germany was authorised to press the 
button and send it off. Thus, a very complex process. It is now being simplified and we 
are now in the trial runs, so we have decentralised access with the State Criminal 
Police Office. By the end of the year, individual departments in the state, (city in east-
ern Germany) and others that are still to be determined will have direct access to 
SIENA." (Prosecutor, GW05) 
Finally, however, it is also emphasised that the instruments provided by Europol need to be 
used in order to be effective: 
“We are learning that information is available when we are dealing with big enquir-
ies, if we simply ask about them, via the Europol channel or even our network, we get 
an incredible amount of information. That means they are there and the cross-regional 
perpetrators are not invisible. They have left traces behind. Now we have to connect 
the loose ends, that's just the first step towards getting involved more successfully." 
(Police officer, GW07) 
Next to SIENA, this also applies to information databases such as EIS (see Section 2.3): 
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"Europol has its own information system, which is actually quite okay in terms of its 
usefulness, that is called the EIS, Europol Information System, the only problem is 
that a system is only as good as the information that’s fed into it. They should have 
continued feeding more in the past to get more information. We regularly make en-
quiries there, but let’s say for Family M., where we are still looking for information 
about them, we learn that they are somewhere in Belgium, we checked there once, but 
that’s as far as it goes. That’s not information that might come out of our investigation, 
if I want it I have to maintain direct contact with Belgium, I have to ask there: what 
do you have there, but they have not input that information cleanly and comprehen-
sively. But, once that has been brought in, it can be very helpful." (Police officer, 
GW03) 
These databases need to be supplied with information before they can really be used and no 
separate inquiries need to be made to individual countries. This underlines the procedural nature 
of cooperation between the countries and Europol. Access to Europol's services is currently 
being further expanded and investigators are increasingly integrating the use of these services 
into their investigative practices. 
3.2.2.2.4 Personal contacts 
In addition to these official and legally regulated procedures of international cooperation, how-
ever, the expert interviews reveal the particular significance of personal contacts with investi-
gating officials abroad. One advantage here is to avoid the lengthy processes described above 
when using official contact channels: 
"And actually we have organisations, the Federal Criminal Police Office, the State 
Criminal Police Offices and then the departments, everything is supposed to go 
through official channels. And if you were to rely on the official channels, you would 
left hanging in some respects and it would take far too long." (Police officer, AK05) 
Personal contacts with officials in other countries often take the form of international confer-
ences or similar meetings at the police level: 
"However, of course, if you have dealt with a field like this for many years, you will 
know the appropriate people through joint conferences and you will be able to get 
prior information directly from the start.” (Police officer, GW02) 
In addition, contacts are established by bilateral investigation teams. On the one hand, personal 
exchanges lead to a relationship of trust that establishes a solid basis for cooperation, particu-
larly in countries where the existence of widespread corruption is assumed. On the other hand, 
however, personal exchanges also create understanding for the other side’s investigating meth-
ods. In this context, officials discuss legal options, particularly with regard to data protection 
regulations, and the information required to justify certain measures. 
Although public prosecutors acknowledge the advantage of these personal contacts, it is still 
difficult to bring such information into proceedings in a way that allows the information to be 
used in court: 
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"The only thing that really works well are these private contacts with the police in 
other countries’ departments, but as a public prosecutor the information is always a 
problem, if it is crucial information you need to apply for legal assistance to incorpo-
rate it into the proceedings, and with legal assistance you are dependent on the other 
state and hoping that you receive an answer sometime soon." (Prosecutor, AK15) 
Cooperation based solely on personal contacts is thus subject to legal limits. In this way, it is 
possible to obtain initial information that may also help to determine whether a more extensive 
investigation could be worthwhile. 
3.2.2.3 Goals of international cooperation 
The goals and topics of international cooperation are extremely diverse and differ, among other 
things, in terms of extent. Cooperation can range from rather small issues, such as requests for 
identity information, all the way to extensive joint investigations. 
3.2.2.3.1 Exchange of information 
A central concern when contacting foreign authorities is requesting various kinds of infor-
mation. This information may relate to the identity of suspects such as personal details, ad-
dresses, bank details, family members, vehicle owner enquiries or the name associated with a 
telephone number. Furthermore, some of the enquiries relate to the local police’s additional 
findings about the person in question and whether they are aware of connections to other per-
petrators. 
3.2.2.3.2 Joint investigative activities 
In addition to exchanging information, another concern of international cooperation can be law 
enforcement activities with other countries, either with other affected countries or the perpetra-
tors’ countries of origin. 
There is a wide variety of possible measures. For example, officials report telecommunications 
surveillance carried out by foreign civil servants for German investigations in other countries, 
as well as direct surveillance. Furthermore, local building searches can be useful: 
“When you make an arrest, you also have to prepare searches of flats. That means I 
have to make sure I can search through flats for any stolen property very soon after 
the perpetrator’s arrest, i.e. I am looking for evidence of other crimes committed in 
Germany. This is where I would contact my Polish colleagues in this case and say: ‘I 
want to search the homes of these three or four people very soon or at the same time.’” 
(Police officer, AK16) 
In some cases, the German police or public prosecutor's office is also involved in searches 
abroad: 
"When I was in [state in the south of Germany], I searched in Poland, for example, I 
was there personally in Poland and I searched there as well." (Prosecutor, AK07) 
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When German officials act in the perpetrators’ countries of origin, the aim is not only collecting 
evidence but also the hope of deterring crimes by making it clear that German investigations 
do not necessarily stop at the national border.  
Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) are a special form of joint investigation (see Section 2.7). 
However, expert assessments of the benefits and relevance of JITs vary significantly. On the 
one hand, JITs are seen as valuable support by providing resources for cooperative investiga-
tion:  
"A JIT was set up there. It was quite helpful, not only because it brought in more 
money, assistance of interpreters, travel, establish contact. We also got arrests in the 
[city in southern Germany] case with extradition to [city in southern Germany]." (Po-
lice officer, GW10) 
Eurojust creates an infrastructure that enables international cooperation within a legally secure 
framework and removes language barriers in communication. This can be particularly helpful 
if the other country with which cooperation is sought does not have sufficient financial re-
sources to handle travel and similar aspects itself. Experts also stated that a JIT is a prerequisite 
for truly collaborative investigative work, in part due to direct personal cooperation in the same 
location: 
“The JIT format is the only real kind of collaboration (P1: Yes, exactly) and it replaces 
the rest and (P: Exactly) there should really be a lot more of them." (Police officer, 
AK05) 
On the other hand, however, JITs are also associated with time and bureaucracy, especially if 
the parties involved are not yet familiar with the exact procedure: 
"Or, if you look at these Joint Investigation Teams, which are rare. It’s an incredibly 
difficult procedure, but if the partner country is prepared to follow parallel proceed-
ings, via Eurojust, so to speak, it can be a lucrative thing if you know how to do it, 
we’ve seen that in the area of motor vehicles.” (Police officer, GW05) 
The length of time is particularly problematic if the target group of perpetrators is characterised 
by their high willingness to move. While JITs are reported in the area of drug trafficking or car 
theft, this procedure often fails to be beneficial for investigators and public prosecutors in the 
area of residential burglary: 
"So we have joint investigation teams in [state] in other crime areas, including prop-
erty theft, but we haven’t had them for residential burglary in the last decade. But I 
have to say honestly, especially with the perpetrators rapidly changing locations, even 
if they relocate their area of activity within weeks or months, by the time a Joint In-
vestigation Team is set up, by the time the contracts are concluded and everyone 
knows how and in which teams they will collaborate, this perpetrator structure has 
often already disappeared. So although international cooperation is important, and 
especially with Denmark it works very quickly and without complications, or with 
Scandinavia via [city in Denmark] and sometimes a Joint Investigation Team would 
be useful, but given this type of offence and the way the perpetrators move, it does not 
make sense.“ (Police officer, AK08) 
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In one case, a public prosecutor also reported a very negative experience with a JIT that turned 
out to be very complicated to organise and which was finally terminated because an investigat-
ing judge from another country left the team. For this reason, JITs are only sought within ex-
tensive investigations that are planned over a longer period of time. However, there have also 
been long-term international criminal investigations against groups of perpetrators in the resi-
dential burglary sector that achieved very successful results without a JIT being established or 
even sought. This is possible in such cases because of the large number of personal contacts 
among the central investigators and a high willingness on both sides to investigate the involved 
perpetrator groups. The involvement of liaison officers is also important here. 
3.2.2.3.3 European arrest warrant and extradition request 
International cooperation also involves the enforcement of European arrest warrants and extra-
dition requests. The investigators interviewed were very satisfied with their experience with 
these two legal instruments. 
3.2.2.4 Summary of key problems in international cooperation 
In summary, the main problems for international cooperation in the investigation of residential 
burglary are a lack of trust and difficulties in the practical implementation of cooperative in-
vestigations. Reservations about Eastern European countries play a decisive role here. It also 
appears that investigative authorities who sought contact with the perpetrators’ countries of 
origin mainly report positive experiences. One of the reasons for this is the European Union's 
successful integration efforts.  
Trust is primarily established through personal meetings, particularly through conferences and 
events that facilitate police exchanges. Personal contact, which is often established by liaison 
officers of the Federal Criminal Police Office, facilitates the start of international cooperation 
as well as other formal processes. However, the importance of personal contacts is also viewed 
critically: 
"I would like there to be structures, I don't want to depend on individual goodwill, I 
don’t want to have to rely on people acting, I want there to be structures that work." 
(Prosecutor, GW06) 
If the success of international cooperation efforts depends on personal contacts, then it primarily 
depends on individuals. In the selected interview excerpts, a public prosecutor points out the 
need to establish structures that guarantee cooperation and enable the rule of law to be applied. 
When it comes to formal procedures, however, the main problems are the duration and com-
plexity of these procedures: 
"It is no use to me if the procedure here is closed today, because France takes nine 
months to give me an answer. The prosecution or the court is not going to wait for 
that. It falls between the cracks and then it's done, end of story. A lot of things fail this 
way." (Police officer, GW04) 
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The investigators interviewed, however, take a predominantly positive view of the efforts and 
development of Europol's services. In the future, it will become apparent to what extent data-
bases and communication software are made easily accessible for criminal investigations, and 
to what extent they will actually be used.  
Language barriers are another hurdle in personal exchanges and for the use of formal legal 
instruments or databases as well as the communication channel SIENA. The investigators de-
scribe that some of them had to overcome their inhibitions to communicate in English. 
Further hurdles include different legal systems and official structures in other countries. Here 
too, personal contact can help to gain an understanding of the other side's legal situation, struc-
tures and work processes. The following example illustrates the importance of understanding 
the approaches of other countries:  
"I would also like to mention these organisational challenges, it’s simply that the 
Dutch have a completely different legal system, they don’t operate with an obligation 
to prosecute, it is only based on the principle of opportunity. You have to convince the 
Dutch to even join the investigation at all, then you can get started. So when we are 
alone in the field, cooperation is a no-go. There are different things, different condi-
tions you have to consider in order to get started or accomplish something." (Police 
officer, GW07) 
There is no principle of legality in the Netherlands. German police officers are therefore more 
likely to need to give reasons why investigating certain crimes might be worthwhile. This is 
just one small example of how knowledge of other structures can be helpful when approaching 
foreign investigating authorities in order to optimise the probability of cooperation. 
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3.2.3 Perspectives and experiences of foreign law enforcement authorities 
The attitudes and experiences of the surveyed foreign law enforcement authorities are described 
below. 
3.2.3.1 Willingness to participate in international cooperation 
Discussions with police officers in the selected Eastern European countries revealed that bur-
glaries were also committed and investigated in these countries: 
"We have a problem with residential burglary. As far as I have observed, this is a 
problem throughout Europe and it is on the rise. That's what the statistics say, as far 
as I have seen. In Romania as well. However there is less (X) occurring than in the 
2000s." (Police officer, Romania) 
Since becoming a member of the EU, Croatia has also registered a strong increase. The police 
particularly mention perpetrators from neighbouring countries. 
Similarly to Germany, residential burglary is also an urban phenomenon in Eastern European 
countries, with most burglaries occurring in larger cities. There seems to be a significant pro-
portion of perpetrators who do not exclusively target their own place of residence, but are per-
ceived as mobile and flexible. 
Not all perpetrators of burglary in the aforementioned Eastern European countries commit prop-
erty offences in Germany or other Western European countries. However, a large proportion of 
burglars who commit crimes in Germany have already committed crimes in their home country. 
For this reason, the police in Eastern European countries also have information on the perpe-
trators who become known to the police in Germany. As a result, more detailed information on 
suspects can often be provided when German investigating authorities establish contact. One 
Romanian police officer mentioned an example of successful cooperation where a decisive role 
was played by the exchange of information or local information from the scene: 
This is a circle, it's like a circle, it's like a ring around Bucharest. The perpetrators 
were already specialised in this area and three years ago they moved to Germany en 
masse. All three of these individuals registered secondary residences there and made 
contacts with Germans. They settled in and, let's say, had a normal life and then 
started identifying suitable burglary sites. (...) The German police naturally became 
aware of this and our German colleagues said: ‘Can you identify any of the perpetra-
tors?’ and then immediately contacted us for support. We already knew the people 
who had been identified in Germany, including (X). And then we informed our German 
colleagues of all the knowledge we had about them, and about the people from their 
surroundings, circle of acquaintances, relatives. And we told them exactly where they 
lived, their address here in Ilfov County. The German police, as we know, had man-
aged to observe all these people in Germany. Telecommunications surveillance was 
initiated, vehicles were monitored. Then they were caught in the act and arrested, and 
in the course of further investigations, it was proven that they had committed other 
crimes." (Police officer, Romania) 
Since the perpetrators also commit crimes in their respective home countries, the foreign inves-
tigating authorities have an interest in prosecuting these individuals. The following section of 
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the interview illustrates this using a concrete example of joint investigation activity between 
Romania and Great Britain: 
"In the beginning, when we didn’t have much experience, Britain had the initiative. 
But we were quickly able to convince ourselves that this was an efficient process, and 
we took the initiative ourselves. Especially since we knew that the perpetrators get 
organised and formed up here, and then commit the crimes abroad. And since they 
were traveling perpetrators who were very mobile, this joint investigation team, this 
form of cooperation, gave us the opportunity to react very quickly and engage con-
cretely. We had also had successes. There were perpetrators who were caught red-
handed. We had the information and communicated it very quickly because of our 
foreign partners and they were able to catch the perpetrators. (...) They have been 
charged in both countries, but for different crimes. In Romania for setting up an or-
ganised crime group. And abroad, where this crime was not necessarily evident, they 
were accused of the specific crimes. The leaders of the groups have been indicted in 
Romania. And, of course, we were very careful to make sure they would not be charged 
or prosecuted twice for the same offence." (Police officer, Romania) 
However, the interviews conducted show that all countries involved are also willing to cooper-
ate outside of their own self-interest, regardless of whether the countries themselves are affected 
by the crimes. This becomes clear in the following excerpt, although this concerns robbery 
offences: 
"Even if the crimes were not committed in Romania, but in other European countries 
including Germany. We hope that we can start ISF International Security Funds pro-
jects, joint projects to get this issue of robbery under control. With this approach, we 
hope we can do better investigative work when dealing with highly professional or-
ganised groups. This also means how the structures are organised, their procedures, 
their methods. How everything works. These are organised groups that are highly 
professional. And then there are tools for cooperation, requests for mutual assistance. 
But also joint investigation teams that make it possible to cooperate and engage di-
rectly. That's the case mainly with France and Britain, these joint investigation 
teams." (Police officer, Romania) 
Romania also informs Germany about its knowledge of perpetrators who are on their way to 
Germany to commit crimes: 
And another situation is when Romanian police officers have knowledge of Romanians 
who intend to travel to Germany or Western Europe or abroad to commit crimes there. 
We communicate this to them, the German police authorities in this case and then they 
are armed, so to speak. (Police officer, Romania) 
The police in Albania are critical of a lack of international cooperation in the past, and stress 
the importance of cooperation in the present: 
"In Albania our worldview is that as long as I am not directly concerned, then every-
thing is fine. If something happens to my neighbour, I don't care much. And if you look 
at it in terms of crime, this mentality existed for a long time in other EU countries as 
well. As a result, cooperation has been very bureaucratic so far, and not many con-
crete steps have been taken to combat this issue in practice. But at the same time, the 
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criminals are getting faster and better. They have no hurdles amongst themselves, 
different religions or mentalities are not an issue, they all agree. They work very well 
together to pursue their criminal intentions. In other words, the perpetrators have no 
homeland. If we are talking about the fight against crime, we will have to overcome 
many barriers, many of the hurdles that exist today. And the reactions of the interna-
tional organisations and all countries affected needs to be much stronger, of course. 
What I’m saying is just my opinion. That's how I see it. Starting from these commit-
ments, we then took concrete steps to strengthen cooperation, both at the national 
level and in relation to specific states in Germany. And we think we've made good 
progress there." (Police officer, Albania) 
The quoted claim that perpetrators have no homeland illustrates a common problem, because 
perpetrators commit crimes in several countries. The claim also makes an appeal for joint in-
vestigations that turn the perpetrators’ situations to the investigators’ advantage. Willingness to 
cooperate is also mentioned in other interviews. The following statement of the Moldovan po-
lice at the end of the interview was particularly significant: 
"Our colleagues here are young, but they are very enthusiastic. They're very commit-
ted and they really want to accomplish a lot." (Republic of Moldova) 
Albania also benefits from requests for information by registering this data and later making it 
available to the Albanian police: 
"In the past, we answered these requests and then sent the answer back to the request-
ing party, but nowadays we also register the personal data concerning individuals or 
factual circumstances in our databases, and then we have that source of information 
for our investigations, for our objectives here. This is a very important change that 
has helped us with our work." (Police officer, Albania) 
In this respect, the view frequently expressed in the interviews with German civil servants, 
namely that Eastern Europeans are unwilling to cooperate due to a lack of self-interest, does 
not hold true in this dimension. In addition to a willingness to provide support, the interviews 
in foreign countries revealed numerous aspects of international cooperation that also benefited 
the Eastern European countries in question. 
However, police officers in Eastern European countries were sometimes sceptical about Ger-
man investigators making contact. In particular, some interviews addressed concerns about cor-
ruption and a resulting lack of trust, which needs to be established before passing on infor-
mation. Foreign investigators were well aware of the corruption problems in their own coun-
tries, but emphasized that not all police officers were corrupt: 
"There are many other colleagues like [name of liaison officer], i.e. other people from 
other partner authorities doing the same job here in Albania, such as [name of liaison 
officer], so they are liaison officers. But many are also of the opinion that the [name 
of country] police are corrupt and they have also expressed this openly. And, of 
course, cooperation with these countries is limited to bureaucratic cooperation, so it 
is very democratic cooperation and the work mainly occurs within the framework of 
legal assistance. But it is based on very simple logic. If you ask yourself, what would 
each of us gain, what would be the point of turning them down? Of course, in the 
[name of the country] police there are also corrupt employees. That is not a secret, 
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and we say it openly when cooperating with our partners. This is a battle that must 
continue and we won’t win it in a day or a year. This does not mean, however, that 
other countries do not cooperate with [name of the country]. So [name of liaison of-
ficer] has overcome this way of thinking, and that has led to the level of cooperation 
that exists today." (Foreign police officer) 
3.2.3.2 Channels for international cooperation 
Similarly to the German investigators, the police officers questioned abroad also emphasize the 
importance of personal contacts: 
"Personal contacts are very important, because it is easier to understand the proce-
dure or the state of affairs when you are on the phone than, for example, when you 
receive a piece of paper with a picture and some information. In a personal conver-
sation you can learn more about the investigative procedure and you can, for example, 
learn why it is important to identify this person, why that is significant for the investi-
gation." (Police officer, Republic of Moldova) 
In the rest of the interview, the Moldovan police explained the impact of personal meetings and 
the importance of understanding the other country’s legal situation: 
"(...) after two hours of discussion, even though the officer from Germany does not 
speak Romanian and the officer from Moldova does not speak German, after two 
hours of discussion they realise that they actually get along very well. These opera-
tional meetings are very successful in part because they help us better understand and 
get to know the legislation of the country in question. In addition, personal contacts 
are established that will be maintained for years to come." (Police officer, Republic 
of Moldova) 
Personal contact can also lead to rapid cooperation, which is sometimes seen as an alternative 
to long bureaucratic channels:  
"Here in Moldova a group of burglars has been arrested and at the same time the 
Austrian officers have been informed that a similar crime has been committed in Vi-
enna. The Austrian officers did not manage to arrest the perpetrators, but they were 
able to establish their identity. This information was passed on directly to their col-
leagues and three crimes were solved, one in Moldova, one in Italy and the other in 
Austria, in Vienna, committed by the same group that was arrested here in Moldova." 
(Police officer, Republic of Moldova) 
The importance of personal contacts established through workshops and conferences is also 
emphasised in Croatia. However, Europol's SIENA communication channel is also an important 
means of communication for international cooperation. This is also an important tool for Mol-
dova: 
"Since 2015 we have been using this channel for communication. So what my col-
league was mentioning earlier, [name of a police officer], he was simply underscoring 
that there is now a more lively exchange of experience or data thanks to this SIENA 
communication channel. Until now, Germany has not been of great interest to Mol-
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dovan citizens. Moldovan citizens have mostly emigrated to countries that speak Ro-
mance languages, i.e. Italy, Portugal, France, Spain. France, Belgium. We have now 
analysed the information and found that our citizens are currently more interested in 
Germany. And they have very specific and clear goals." (Police officer, Republic of 
Moldova) 
The SIENA enquiries enabled the Republic of Moldova to discover that there had been an in-
crease in Moldovan criminals in Germany. However, Moldovan police are also very open to 
joint investigation teams. 
In practice, the Eastern European countries surveyed vary widely in terms of the intensity of 
their cooperation with German investigators regarding organised residential burglary. This is 
often primarily a question of selectively exchanging information, but in some cases there is also 
very close cooperation. Investigators also mention collaborative house searches in the countries 
in question: 
“In most situations, not only with Germany but also with other states, we reach the 
phase where we are conducting house searches and interrogations. And in many cases 
we will also inform them that these house searches are taking place. Often German 
police officers join the searches in Romania and take part in them as well. And Ro-
manian law allows that." (Police officer, Romania) 
Intensive cooperation with another country tends to take the form of joint workshops and joint 
visits, which are considered to be very beneficial. The Romanian police are also open to the 
idea of a joint task force: 
"Well, in my view, it’s important that there are several task forces. That is, investiga-
tive teams that would focus on traveling perpetrators. These task forces, I imagine, 
would be made up of investigators from the perpetrators’ country of origin and offi-
cials from the target countries. Task forces should include investigators, officials spe-
cialising in evaluation and analysis. Officials who maintain contact with the opera-
tional units. For example, surveillance measures. And I imagine that during this 
phase, this kind of task force would have a leader. That could be a prosecutor or an 
investigator. In any case, someone who has decision-making authority and can also 
pass on orders. And I believe there should be someone in the task force, an official 
who specialises in identifying and seizing the stolen property and the whole process 
and proceedings up through the recovery of damages, the recovery of assets." (Police 
officer, Romania) 
3.2.3.3 Possibilities for (international) investigation 
As in the German expert interviews, respondents from foreign investigative authorities com-
plain about long bureaucratic channels in the context of international cooperation. In particular, 
requests for mutual assistance are perceived as lengthy: 
“The problem with requests for mutual legal assistance is that they take a long time. 
I don’t want to say it’s bureaucratic, but it takes a long time because other legal au-
thorities are also involved. The public prosecutor's office, for example, or other au-
thorities. And this can take up to six months or even a year. That's why he [phrasing 
of interpreter; he is referring to his interview partner] emphasized again how important 
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these personal contacts and conversations are, because you can exchange this infor-
mation very quickly and the perpetrators can be identified and arrested as quickly as 
possible." (Police officer, Republic of Moldova) 
Furthermore, the process of recording traces in the Eastern European countries surveyed is not 
comparable with the police equipment in Germany. The Republic of Moldova, for example, 
does not record DNA traces itself; instead, they cooperate with a laboratory in Romania. The 
police in Albania also emphasized the differences in police equipment: 
"And you can’t forget that the conditions faced by Albanian state police in their work 
are not at all comparable to the working conditions for German citizens or the Ger-
man police. This is the case in many areas, from human resources to working condi-
tions and resources, that is, the equipment available to a police officer here. DNA 
tracing, for example, is one of the ways to resolve a case in Germany (...). Of course 
it is very important to have a database for comparison, but this aspect is still in its 
infancy in Albania. However, in recent years we have had some very important cases, 
for instance crimes that could only be solved based on DNA traces.” (Police officer, 
Albania) 
The Lithuanian police assesses the conditions for international cooperation as generally good: 
"Well, I believe that the current tools available are sufficient. The EU applies national 
laws and EU law, and there are bilateral agreements on specific cases. What perhaps 
could still be described as a problem are new technologies, but that problem can be 
found everywhere, both in Germany and here. The amount of information, the infor-
mation in cyberspace, this shift in communication tools. There are task forces dealing 
with this, there is now the European Investigation Order, we ratified it and it exists, 
so there are tools." (Police officer, Lithuania) 
In addition to legal and investigative tools, the Lithuanian police also value cooperation with 
German police authorities: 
“So I'm personally enthusiastic about, fascinated by, when it comes to my German 
colleagues, is their level of precision and their commitment to promises.” (Police of-
ficer, Lithuania) 
In addition, interviews with the Eastern European investigating authorities also discussed the 
possibility of a fact-finding process, financial investigation and asset recovery. When asked 
whether a fact-finding mission would be conducted and evidence would be secured, a police 
officer from Albania replied as follows: 
"We always try to do that. That’s true. This is one of the goals of our proceedings. If 
things are found during searches, they are recorded immediately, since they may be 
evidence that establishes a link between the crime and the person." (Police officer, 
Albania) 
In some interviews, however, officers stated that there is insufficient capacity to store the items 
found during searches, especially for larger stolen goods such as a large number of bicycles. 
Efforts to conduct financial investigations are also reported, for example in Romania: 
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"Cracking ATMs. Through this cooperative channel, we have also taken on what we 
consider to be an important role and are dealing with financial investigations, be-
cause we are conscious of the significant problem faced in many cases where the dam-
ages are not ultimately recovered. Where the money expected through this channel is 
not returned to the injured party. So we would now like to focus on an entirely different 
direction, namely money laundering and the identification of movable and immovable 
goods procured from these funds in Romania. Of course, the aim is to seize them. We 
have had cases of burglary, specifically at several jewellery stores. In these cases, the 
leaders of the group were in Romania and they were under investigation for setting 
up an organised crime group." (Police officer, Romania) 
Asset recovery is not provided for in Albania with respect to the crime of residential burglary, 
which is critically examined in the following section: 
"For example, the problem we have here, as far as I know it is different here than in 
Germany, though I am not sure how it works in Germany: when we identify a burglar, 
for example, and he is brought to court, we have no legal means of securing and con-
fiscating his property, that is the problem here. There is no provision for burglaries, 
thus no organised crime, we can’t take away his property or assets. Let's assume we 
conduct a house search and no stolen objects are found, we have no right, to seize 
other items or other property of his. That is not legally possible here. The perpetrator 
will be punished, convicted, and will serve his sentence, but his finances will not be 
affected at all. And the most crucial factor is that the injured party has no claim to 
compensation for damages." (Police officer, Albania) 
Another particular aspect of international cooperation when identifying perpetrators is lack of 
knowledge about identity numbers. As already mentioned above, some perpetrators legally 
change their names frequently in their home countries. This becomes a problem if the German 
investigating authorities only record their name and date of birth, but not their identity number, 
which cannot be modified: 
"(...) there is a law, for example, that the man takes the woman’s name when they 
marry or changes his name through an administrative process. But it's not a very 
common problem. However, we can still identify this person by their personal identi-
fication number. Considering, of course, that the foreign authorities were not aware 
that this number would remained unchanged, so they only record people by their name 
and date of birth. And even if a person has changed their name, sometimes or often it 
is not possible to identify a direct connection between different crimes committed by 
the same perpetrator. (...) We communicate this abroad whenever we have the oppor-
tunity. At any conference or meeting." (Police officer, Romania) 
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4 Summary 
The following is a brief summary of the results based on some of the key research questions 
addressed in the study. 
Who are the perpetrators? 
The perpetrators of organised residential burglaries are typically men aged between 20 and 30. 
In addition, the police officers and public prosecutors questioned also observe women, and even 
children and young people as perpetrators in the context of family-based groups of perpetrators. 
Women and minors as perpetrators of burglaries are thus a particular feature of organised resi-
dential burglary which differs from local perpetrators in Germany. 
The perpetrators of organised burglary usually come from Eastern European countries, espe-
cially from the Balkans, but also from South American countries such as Chile. Not all of these 
perpetrators enter Germany directly to commit crimes; in some cases they have been living in 
Germany for several years or return repeatedly for certain periods of time. Furthermore, they 
often have networks of friends and acquaintances who reside permanently in Germany. 
The survey of police officers from several perpetrator home countries revealed that these per-
petrators not only commit burglaries in Germany, but usually also committed property crimes 
in their home countries. They often stick to the same types of crimes when they travel to West-
ern European countries. 
How do the perpetrators act? 
In terms of their methods when committing crimes, scouting and avoiding meeting local resi-
dents prove crucial. Single-family houses are a particular focus of organised residential bur-
glary. As with other burglaries, prying open and breaking windows are frequent methods. One 
particular aspect discussed is drilling window frames or a method known as window burning 
are mentioned, which is strongly associated with organised burglaries. 
At times the loot is resold locally in Germany at pawnshops and buying/selling shops as well 
as jewellery dealers. Alternately, stolen goods are also brought to the respective home countries 
and sold there. Smaller coach buses, which mainly transport people, are also used for this pur-
pose. 
A particular characteristic in perpetrators of organised burglaries who come from Eastern Eu-
ropean countries is their use of aliases and frequent name changes. Since (legal) name changes 
are not uncommon in certain countries, the perpetrators often have several official documents 
with different names. In some countries, however, citizens are assigned an identity number that 
cannot be changed. 
How are the perpetrators organised? 
The definition of organised crime has some particularities in Germany. Among other things, 
the definition requires more than two perpetrators to be working together collaboratively. The 
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reference to collaborative methods, but also variant a) of the definition, "using commercial or 
business-like structures", prioritise a hierarchical structure in perpetrator groups when classify-
ing organised crime. For this reason, the present study addressed the organisational forms of 
cooperation between perpetrators and to what extent this exhibits a hierarchical structure. 
The evaluation of the expert interviews shows that the groups of perpetrators described are quite 
different in terms of the existence or power of hierarchical structures. For the purposes of cate-
gorising structures, these differences were grouped and subdivided into six organisational forms 
of perpetrators: 
 Loose networks 
 Gangs with a flat hierarchy 
 Gangs with a strict hierarchy  
 Family clans 
 Exploitative conditions 
 Mafia structures 
The order of the list also indicates the degree of hierarchy. In loose networks, perpetrators act 
together in varying arrangements depending on the crime; in gangs with a flat hierarchy, there 
is a fixed group of individuals. Both forms are characterised by the fact that although there is 
collaboration or a division of tasks, there is no command structure in the group where one per-
son has the authority to delegate and make decisions. Rather, all perpetrators are directly in-
volved in the actual crime and divide the stolen goods equally. 
Gangs with a strict hierarchy are also characterised by a fixed arrangement of individuals. How-
ever, the hierarchical structure here involves one person who delegates more. Family clans are 
more tightly organised. In these clans, almost all family members are involved in committing 
property crimes. Older family members are often the decision-makers. One particularity with 
regard to family clans is that women and children as well as young people are also involved in 
committing the crimes. 
Furthermore, the expert interviews revealed organisational forms that involve exploitation con-
ditions. Different hierarchy levels are evident here, with the lowest level occupied by the people 
who commit the crimes. They typically have to hand over stolen goods in order to “work off" 
their travel costs to Germany or their rent in Germany. 
Strong hierarchical forms of organisation can also be found in mafia structures, although these 
are rarely observed behind organised residential burglaries. The organisational structure of 
"thieves in law" is explicitly mentioned. 
With regard to the organisational forms of the perpetrators, there is a wide range of different 
types of cooperation. As demonstrated in a previous study (Wollinger & Jukschat, 2017), the 
typical profile of a constant gang of burglars proves to be too one-dimensional.  
Another key finding is that the strength of hierarchy does not necessarily imply a certain degree 
of professionalization. Even perpetrators who tend to commit burglaries together in loose net-
works can proceed in a very planned and professional manner and achieve high values of stolen 
goods. One reason for this is that committing burglaries requires little special knowledge in 
order to commit the crime and resell the stolen goods.  
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Furthermore, it becomes clear that the boundaries between different forms of organisation are 
fluid. Thus, even organised perpetrator groups with a strong hierarchy sometimes bring in less 
experienced perpetrators to commit individual residential burglaries. 
Are organised residential burglaries considered organised crime? 
A central question of this research project was to examine the extent to which organised resi-
dential burglary is also a form of organised crime. Organised crime is subject to a special defi-
nition in Germany based on hierarchical structures with a high degree of organisation involving 
a fixed arrangement of individuals, among other factors. The interviews showed that such forms 
of organisation are rarely behind organised residential burglaries. This is also the assessment of 
the experts surveyed. This is because committing burglaries does not require extensive 
knowledge of methods nor a professional receiver arrangement for selling the stolen property. 
In other words: in order to make money committing burglaries, it is not necessary to have a 
large organisation. For this reason, many perpetrators act according to a plan and are therefore 
organised in a certain sense. However, these forms of organisation do not necessarily consist of 
a fixed group of people acting collaboratively within a hierarchical structure. 
Nevertheless, it seems useful for investigating authorities to engage special investigation teams 
to deal with these crimes, some of which are organised crimes departments. This is due to the 
large number of burglaries committed by the perpetrators and their high degree of mobility. For 
investigative work to be successful, the crimes and suspects in question must be investigated in 
one context, that is, centrally. 
These findings lead to questions of how appropriate the German definition of organised crime 
is. It should be pointed out once again that organised crime does not refer to a criminal offence; 
instead, it serves to coordinate work between the police and the public prosecutor's office. How-
ever, if it seems beneficial to define organised residential burglaries as organised crime, this 
indicates a need to revise the definition of organised crime. A new definition of organised crime 
in terms of content could be derived from the existing definitions in other countries or authori-
ties. Europol's definition of “organised crime groups", which consist of at least three people 
who commit crimes over a certain period of time in order to make financial gain (Europol 
2017a, p. 13), might be appropriate. 
What problems arise for the German criminal investigation authorities? 
In addition to general problems of criminal prosecution in residential burglary cases, mostly 
related to excessively long evaluation periods for traces and personnel shortages, there are also 
some specific hurdles in investigations relating to organised residential burglary. Some of the 
experts surveyed would like to see more powers of intervention during the investigation. This 
is based on the fact that the crime in itself does not provide much initial information as to 
whether a collaborative, professional organisation of perpetrators is behind it. However, such 
information, which often only becomes apparent during more extensive investigations, is im-
portant for establishing more extensive investigative authorisations. 
It is also mentioned that a designated public prosecutor's office is very helpful in investigating 
organised residential burglary. If different public prosecutors are responsible for the various 
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cases who do not mainly deal with residential burglaries, it is difficult to cooperate and carry 
out in-depth investigations. This assessment is also shared by the public prosecutors inter-
viewed. 
In addition to cooperation between the police and the public prosecutor's office, however, there 
is also a need for changes to cooperation among police offices. One major problem is the federal 
structure of the police force within Germany. In addition to questions of jurisdiction for perpe-
trators who commit crimes in several federal states, police work is also hindered by the exist-
ence of various processing system databases. 
To what extent do German investigating authorities also investigate internationally and what 
are their experiences in this regard? 
Most of the interviewed experts observed an international dimension to organised residential 
burglaries. However, not all of them are prepared to work together with foreign police authori-
ties to conduct the investigation. In part, this is due to the additional work involved. On the 
other hand, contact is not established with foreign authorities, since this is not viewed as expe-
dient. This assumption is partly based on one-time experiences that have not brought about the 
desired results. With regard to Eastern European countries, however, there are also reservations 
about the extent to which trust-based cooperation is even possible due to corrupt organisations. 
The fear is that information will be disclosed and the perpetrator group in question will be 
warned. 
A different picture emerges from the experience reported by experts who have actually at-
tempted to make contact with foreign authorities. It is actually the Western European countries 
which are characterised by a lack of willingness to cooperate and long response times. German 
civil servants who have established contact with Eastern European countries have had almost 
exclusively positive experiences. They are often surprised themselves how quickly they estab-
lish contact and how willing the authorities are to cooperate. 
Overall, the interviews showed that willingness to conduct international investigations depends 
heavily on the investigators' own attitudes and judgment of how successful this approach will 
be, in part based on previous experience. Individual negative experiences can easily be gener-
alised into poor opportunities for cooperation with the respective country. Positive experiences, 
and above all personal contacts and meetings, made possible by international conferences and 
workshops for instance, lead to increased interest in international cooperation. 
In this context, the work done by Europol is mentioned in an increasingly positive light due to 
its important role as a mediator. Emphasis is also placed on the SIENA communication soft-
ware, and experts strongly desire the spread of SIENA connections. 
International cooperation primarily focuses on the exchange of information regarding perpetra-
tors. However, experts also discussed joint investigative activities that can even lead to joint 
searches in the countries in question. 
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How do foreign criminal investigation authorities view the phenomenon of organised residen-
tial burglary and international cooperation? 
During the interviews with foreign authorities, first of all, it became apparent that the crime of 
residential burglary is also relevant in these countries. Perpetrators of organised burglary who 
commit crimes in Germany were often noticed by the investigating authorities in their home 
countries as well. In this respect, foreign investigating authorities have information on the per-
petrators, and in some cases they also benefit from the investigations conducted by German 
authorities. 
However, the experts surveyed also showed an interest in exchange and cooperation. This is 
often due to long-standing reform processes in their countries, largely based on integration ef-
forts as part of EU accession procedures or accession negotiations. 
While certain evaluation procedures in these countries, DNA analysis in particular, are not yet 
comparable with the situation in Germany, and there is a lack of comprehensive databases as a 
result, foreign authorities do have information about the organisations and perpetrators. They 
also contact German authorities on their own initiative when perpetrators go to Germany to 
commit burglaries. 
When exchanging information with foreign authorities, emphasis should be placed on the im-
portance of identification numbers that cannot be changed. This is because in some countries it 
is not uncommon for people to change their names (legally) several times during the course of 
their life. 
Europol's services that foster international cooperation are particularly important for Eastern 
European countries. They often involve financial resources which enable meetings to even take 
place. These conversations again showed the special significance of personal contacts. Even if 
official means such as requests for legal assistance are still necessary in order to use information 
and evidence, personal contacts create the necessary basis of trust and knowledge of methods 
used by different police forces, and what they need for their investigations. 
Successful examples of cooperation have developed primarily where there have been efforts to 
get to know investigators personally and foster exchange between investigators. In one country, 
an on-site workshop was held and attended by the central investigators in the proceedings and 
subsequently used as the basis for effective cooperation.  
The problem with this approach, however, is that these methods depend on individuals. As soon 
as responsibilities change, the personal contacts that were previously important no longer exist. 
In this respect, the importance of personal contacts can also be viewed critically. Ultimately, 
they do not obviate the need to review the effectiveness of standardised procedures for interna-
tional cooperation. In particular, the option of requesting mutual assistance is perceived as time-
consuming and bureaucratic by both German and foreign authorities. However, policymakers 
have responded, recently introducing the European Investigation Order as a tool. The extent to 
which this resolves previous difficulties will become apparent in the future. 
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6 Appendix 
 
Interview Guide for Expert Interviews in Germany  
for the research project  
“Organised crime in the area of residential burglary" 
 
Introduction: 
Thank you very much for taking the time for the interview and for being willing to talk to us 
about your experiences. Before we start the interview, I would like to tell you briefly what the 
research project is about. We are conducting a research project on the topic of "Organised crime 
in the area of residential burglary". Within the scope of this research project, we would like to 
gain new insights into this particular crime phenomenon and make these insights available for 
practical use.  
Today we are interested in your professional experiences and views on this topic.  
(Is this okay so far?) 
(Good,) in the course of our conversation we will now ask you various open questions, and I 
will ask you to simply tell us everything that is relevant and significant for you. While listening 
we will take notes from time to time so we can ask questions later, don't let this disturb you.  
There are no "right" or "wrong" answers in this interview. We are interested in your experiences 
and your point of view, we are not judging. We will also give you enough time, so don't feel 
pressured, we have "all the time in the world" that you would like to take. We estimate that the 
interview will take about an hour or two.  
A few formal matters: 
As we have already told you, we would like to record the interview on tape for later analysis 
and then write it down. This makes it easier for us to follow you in conversation. Of course, we 
will treat the interview material as strictly confidential and anonymous when using it for the 
study. This means: all personal data that allow you to be identified will be deleted, anonymised 
or pseudonymised. We will also guarantee this in writing at the end of the interview in a privacy 
declaration. In addition, data will only be evaluated even anonymously and pseudonymised if 
you have given your consent. 
Is that all right with you so far?  
All right, let's do it.  Switch on the tape now at the latest 
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Topic group: General investigative activities 
Guiding question I: Please explain the investigation process for (organised) residential 
burglary in general terms.  
Content aspects Concrete requests 
Work flow 
Work organisation 
Identification of connections 
Cooperation with other authorities 
 
On what basis are organised crime investigations 
carried out - based on the definition of organised 
crime or § 129 StGB? 
How/when is it decided whether organised crime 
could be involved? 
How are connections recognised? 
How does the cooperation work with the public 
prosecutor's office/police? 
Do you cooperate with customs? 
 
Topic group: Perpetrators and crimes 
Guiding question II: Please tell us about your experiences with perpetrators in this crime 
field based on investigative activities. 
Content aspects Concrete requests 
Countries of origin 
Communication 
Backers 
Background 
 
 
Who are the perpetrators? 
What are the "countries of origin" where these per-
petrators come from? 
How willing are the perpetrators to testify? 
How do the perpetrators communicate with each 
other? 
Are there backers? Was it also possible to identify 
them? 
Why are the burglaries being committed? For pri-
vate financing or are there buyer structures? 
 
Topic group: The phenomenon of organised crime 
Guiding question III: How do you generally observe organised crime in the area of resi-
dential burglary? 
Content aspects Concrete requests 
Forms observed 
Developments 
Investigation measures 
 
 
How are the perpetrators organised? 
How do you recognise organised structures/connec-
tions? 
Are there any clues to identify an organised resi-
dential burglary? 
 
Topic group: Investigation measures 
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Guiding question IV: What are effective investigative techniques when dealing with or-
ganised crime? Please explain this to us using examples. 
Content aspects Concrete requests 
Investigation measures 
Improvement of investigations 
Legal framework conditions 
Definition of organised crime 
 
What are some difficulties in investigative work? 
What would you improve in your investigative 
work? 
What are the legal obstacles in the fight against 
organised crime? 
What legal framework would you like to see for 
investigations dealing with organised crime? 
How do you rate the current legal definition of or-
ganised crime? 
What role does § 129 StGB play? 
 
Topic group: International investigative activities 
Guiding question V: Now let us turn our attention to international investigative activities. 
Please report here on your experience with cross-border investigations, in particular on co-
operation with other authorities.  
Content aspects Concrete requests 
Effectiveness of cooperation 
Joint investigations 
Data quality 
Europol 
 
How is contact established with other investigat-
ing authorities? 
How do joint investigations work? 
How do requests for mutual legal assistance 
work? 
When and how do you contact Europol/Eurojust? 
How is the quality of data during data exchange? 
How do you assess the effectiveness of the Joint 
Investigation Teams? 
What experience have you had with police coop-
eration agreements? 
 
Closing question:  Now we have discussed a few things: is there something you would like to 
tell us, something that is still important to you but has not yet been discussed? 
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Interview guide for expert interviews abroad 
for the research project  
“Organised crime in the area of residential burglary" 
 
Introduction: 
Thank you very much for taking the time for the interview and for being willing to talk to us 
about your experiences. Before we start the interview, I would like to tell you briefly what the 
research project is about. We are conducting a research project on the topic of "Organised crime 
in the area of residential burglary". Within the scope of this research project, we would like to 
gain new insights into this particular crime phenomenon and make these insights available for 
practical use.  
Today we are interested in your professional experiences and views on this topic.  
(Is this okay so far?) 
(Good,) in the course of our conversation we will now ask you various open questions, and I 
will ask you to simply tell us everything that is relevant and significant for you. While listening 
we will take notes from time to time so we can ask questions later, don't let this disturb you.  
There are no "right" or "wrong" answers in this interview. We are interested in your experiences 
and your point of view, we are not judging. We will also give you enough time, so don't feel 
pressured, we have "all the time in the world" that you would like to take. We estimate that the 
interview will take about an hour or two.  
A few formal matters: 
As we have already told you, we would like to record the interview on tape for later analysis 
and then write it down. This makes it easier for us to follow you in conversation. Of course, we 
will treat the interview material as strictly confidential and anonymous when using it for the 
study. This means: all personal data that allow you to be identified will be deleted, anonymised 
or pseudonymised. We will also guarantee this in writing at the end of the interview in a privacy 
declaration. In addition, data will only be evaluated even anonymously and pseudonymised if 
you have given your consent. 
Is that all right with you so far?  
All right, let's do it.  Switch on the tape now at the latest 
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Topic: Cooperation between Germany and (country)  
Guiding question I: We would like to start with cooperation between Germany and (coun-
try). How do these countries work together?  
Contents Requests 
Process 
Joint investigations 
Europol 
Joint Investigation Team 
 
How and when do you have contact the German 
police? 
How does cooperation with German investiga-
tive authorities work? 
Are there joint investigations in Germany in the 
area of (organised) residential burglary? 
How do joint investigations work within Ger-
many in the area of (organised) residential bur-
glary? 
Where does collaboration happen? Where are 
the perpetrators being prosecuted?  
Through which institutions does the cooperation 
take place? (Police, State Criminal Police Of-
fice, Federal Criminal Police Office) 
Are there obstacles to cooperation? 
Are there problems with joint investigations due 
to different legal systems? 
Do you cooperate with Europol? 
How does data exchange/data transfer with Ger-
many work? 
Which databases do you use? 
Which investigative measures are successful? 
How does the transfer of evidence take place?  
How is the cooperation between the police and 
the public prosecutor's office in (country)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Topic: Perpetrators 
Guiding question II: Who are the perpetrators of residential burglary? 
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Contents  Requests 
Perpetrators 
Groups  
 
 
 
How are the perpetrators identified?  
How are groups of perpetrators formed? 
What are the reasons for the formation of perpe-
trator groups? 
How are the perpetrators organised? Are there 
family structures? 
Are these perpetrators also active in other areas 
of crime in (country)? 
Does (country) take action against the formation 
of perpetrator groups? 
What happens to the stolen goods? Are they  
brought to (country) or are they already being 
resold in Germany? 
 
Topic: Organised crime 
Guiding question III: When is organised crime considered to exist in (country)? 
Contents Requests 
Definition   
 
Closing question:  Now we have discussed a few things: is there something you would like to 
tell us, something that is still important to you but has not yet been discussed? 
 
